SBI PO Mains Mock Test in Hindi Series 2, SBI Mains Online Test 2019

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढि़ए एवम् उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों के उत्‍तर दीजिए।

निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍नों में कुछ निश्चित चिन्‍हृों #, %, @, $ और © का प्रयोग कर उत्‍तर दीजिए –

1. ‘P # Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से छोटा नहीं है।
2. ‘P © Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा और न ही बड़ा।
3. ‘P $ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो बड़ा है और न ही बराबर।
4. ‘P % Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से बड़ा नहीं है।
5. ‘P @ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा है और न ही बराबर।

आपको निम्‍नलिखित प्रत्‍येक प्रश्‍न में दिये गये कथन को सत्‍य मानना है। और पता लगाइये कि निम्‍नलिखित निष्‍कर्षो I और II में से कौनसा निश्चित रूप से सत्‍य है।

निम्‍न में से किस अभिव्‍यक्ति में ‘L = T’ निश्चित रूप से सत्‍य है?

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढि़ए एवम् उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों के उत्‍तर दीजिए।

निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍नों में कुछ निश्चित चिन्‍हृों #, %, @, $ और © का प्रयोग कर उत्‍तर दीजिए –

1. ‘P # Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से छोटा नहीं है।
2. ‘P © Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा और न ही बड़ा।
3. ‘P $ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो बड़ा है और न ही बराबर।
4. ‘P % Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से बड़ा नहीं है।
5. ‘P @ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा है और न ही बराबर।

आपको निम्‍नलिखित प्रत्‍येक प्रश्‍न में दिये गये कथन को सत्‍य मानना है। और पता लगाइये कि निम्‍नलिखित निष्‍कर्षो I और II में से कौनसा निश्चित रूप से सत्‍य है।

यदि अभिव्‍यक्ति T $ F % H @ S @W # B निश्चित रूप से सत्‍य है तो निम्‍न में से कौनसा सत्‍य है?

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढि़ए एवम् उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों के उत्‍तर दीजिए।

निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍नों में कुछ निश्चित चिन्‍हृों #, %, @, $ और © का प्रयोग कर उत्‍तर दीजिए –

1. ‘P # Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से छोटा नहीं है।
2. ‘P © Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा और न ही बड़ा।
3. ‘P $ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो बड़ा है और न ही बराबर।
4. ‘P % Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से बड़ा नहीं है।
5. ‘P @ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा है और न ही बराबर।

आपको निम्‍नलिखित प्रत्‍येक प्रश्‍न में दिये गये कथन को सत्‍य मानना है। और पता लगाइये कि निम्‍नलिखित निष्‍कर्षो I और II में से कौनसा निश्चित रूप से सत्‍य है।

कथन:– R % P $ F $ M % J, L % C % T @ F © B, O $ T % A © Y

निष्‍कर्ष:– I. B % J
II. Y @ F
III. F $ A
IV. O # R

नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में कुछ कथन दिये गये है एवं उनके नीचे कुछ निष्‍कर्ष दिये गये है। आपको दिये गये कथनों को सत्‍य मानना है, भले ही वे सर्वज्ञात तथ्‍यों से भिन्‍न प्रतीत होते हों। सभी निष्‍कर्षों को पढिये फिर तय कीजिए कि दिया गया कौनसा निष्‍कर्ष कथनों का तार्किक रूप से सही अनुसरण करता है, भले ही सर्वज्ञात तथ्‍य कुछ भ्‍ाी हों।

कथन:– कुछ झील तालाब नहीं है। कुछ मकबरे महल नहीं है। सभी मंदिर पर्वत है। सभी तालाब पर्वत है। सभी महल मंदिर है।
निष्‍कर्ष:– I. सभी मंदिरों का मकबरा हाेना एक सम्‍भावना है।
II. सभी झील महल हो सकती है।
III. कम से कम कुछ झील मंदिर है।
IV. कुछ मकबरा तालाब नहीं हो सकता।

यहॉं नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में एक कथन एवम् उसके नीचे तीन कार्यवाहियॉं (A), (B) एवम् (C) दी गई है। एक कार्यवाही प्रशासनिक रूप से निर्णय करने के बाद उठाया गया कदम होता है। जो कि समस्‍या या नीति के सन्‍दर्भ में सुधार किया गया कार्य होता है। कथन में दी गई सम्‍पूर्ण सूचना को सत्‍य मानना है और तब निर्णय करना है कि सुझायी गई कौनसी कार्यवाही तार्किक रूप से कथन का अनुसरण करती है।

कथन:– एक कोल्‍ड ड्रिंक के प्रबंधक को संदेह है कि उसके कर्मचारियों में से एक दिये गये लक्ष्‍य को पूरा करने के लिए बिक्री के झूठे आँकड़े दिखा रहा है।
कार्यवाहिायॉं :–
(A) उसे तुरंत ही उस गैर जिम्‍मेदार कर्मचारी का पता लगाना चा‍हिये एवम् उसे चेतावनी दी जानी चाहिए।
(B) उसे इस मुद्दे की अनदेखी करनी चाहिए, क्‍योंकि इससे आगे की सिरदर्दी होगी।
(C) उसे अलग – अलग कर्मचारियों की बिक्री के आँकड़ो पर नजर रखनी चाहिए और अंतिम रिपोर्ट की जॉंच की जानी चाहिए।

यहॉं नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में एक कथन एवम् उसके नीचे तीन कार्यवाहियॉं (A), (B) एवम् (C) दी गई है। एक कार्यवाही प्रशासनिक रूप से निर्णय करने के बाद उठाया गया कदम होता है। जो कि समस्‍या या नीति के सन्‍दर्भ में सुधार किया गया कार्य होता है। कथन में दी गई सम्‍पूर्ण सूचना को सत्‍य मानना है और तब निर्णय करना है कि सुझायी गई कौनसी कार्यवाही तार्किक रूप से कथन का अनुसरण करती है।

कथन:– आत्‍महत्‍या के मामलों की संख्‍या देश में खतरनाक दर से बढ़ रही है।
कार्यवाहियॉं:–
(A) सरकार को उन सभी क्षेत्रों पर नजर रखनी चाहिए जहॉं बड़ी संख्‍या में ऐसे मुद्दों की सूचना मिलती है।
(B) आत्‍महत्‍या के कारणों का पता लगायें एवम् उचित कार्यवाही करें।
(C) आत्‍महत्‍या के दोषी पाये जाने वाले लोगों को मानसिक रोगी घोषित कर दिया जाना चाहिए।

यहॉं नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में एक कथन एवम् उसके नीचे तीन कार्यवाहियॉं (A), (B) एवम् (C) दी गई है। एक कार्यवाही प्रशासनिक रूप से निर्णय करने के बाद उठाया गया कदम होता है। जो कि समस्‍या या नीति के सन्‍दर्भ में सुधार किया गया कार्य होता है। कथन में दी गई सम्‍पूर्ण सूचना को सत्‍य मानना है और तब निर्णय करना है कि सुझायी गई कौनसी कार्यवाही तार्किक रूप से कथन का अनुसरण करती है।

कथन:– रैंचो, कक्षा XII का एक विद्यार्थी, उसके सहपाठियों के साथ झगड़ा करता है एवम् उसकी मैडम की बेइज्‍जती करता है।
कार्यवाहियॉं:–
(A) सामान्‍य स्‍कूल – समय व्‍यवहार मानकर ऐसी समस्‍या को अनदेखा कर देंगे।
(B) रैंचो के साथ मशविरा करके उसके आक्रामक व्‍यवहार करने के पीछे के कारणों का पता लगाने का प्रयास करेंगे।
(C) उसे और उसके माता-पिता को सूचित करेंगे कि उसे अन्तिम परीक्षा में नहीं बैठने दिया जाऐगा।

नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में एक प्रश्‍न तथा दो कथन I तथा II दिये गये है। आपको यह तय करना है कि कथनों में दिया गया डाटा प्रश्‍न का उत्तर देने के लिए पर्याप्त है या नहीं। दोनों कथनों को पढिए और उत्तर दीजिए।

एक परिवार में 5 सदस्‍य है। A, S से कैसे सम्‍बन्धित है?
I. B, A का ससुर है एवम् D, A का पुत्र है।
II. S की बहन M है जो कि T की पुत्री है। S, B का पौत्र है।

नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में एक प्रश्‍न तथा दो कथन I तथा II दिये गये है। आपको यह तय करना है कि कथनों में दिया गया डाटा प्रश्‍न का उत्तर देने के लिए पर्याप्त है या नहीं। दोनों कथनों को पढिए और उत्तर दीजिए।

12 बैग का कुल भार कितना होगा, यदि प्रत्‍येक का भार समान हो।
कथन: –
(i) प्रत्‍येक बैग का 3/4 भार 5 किग्रा है।
(ii) 4 बैग का कुल भार, तीन बैग के कुल भार से 10 किग्रा अधिक है।

नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में एक प्रश्‍न तथा दो कथन I तथा II दिये गये है। आपको यह तय करना है कि कथनों में दिया गया डाटा प्रश्‍न का उत्तर देने के लिए पर्याप्त है या नहीं। दोनों कथनों को पढिए और उत्तर दीजिए।

विगत अप्रैल 2010 को अन्तिम रविवार कौंनसा दिन था ?
कथन:–
1. यदि उस माह का प्रथम रविवार पॉंच सितम्‍बर को पड़ा।
2. माह का दूसरा अन्तिम दिन सोमवार था।

नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में एक प्रश्‍न तथा दो कथन I तथा II दिये गये है। आपको यह तय करना है कि कथनों में दिया गया डाटा प्रश्‍न का उत्तर देने के लिए पर्याप्त है या नहीं। दोनों कथनों को पढिए और उत्तर दीजिए।

यहॉं एक पंक्ति है। A एवम् Z के मध्‍य कुल कितने बालक बैठे है?
1. A पंक्ति के दायें से 12 वें स्‍थान पर बैठा है।
2. Z पंक्ति के एकदम मध्‍य में है एवम् 12 बालक उसके बायें है।

नीचे दी गई सूचना को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढिए एवं उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्नों का उत्तर दीजिए –
किसी शब्‍द व्‍यवस्‍थापन मशीन को जब शब्‍दों की इनपुट लाइन दी जाती है, तो वह उन्‍हें हर चरण में एक विशेष नियम के तहत पुनर्व्‍यवस्थित करती हैं। नीचे इनपुट और उसकी पुनर्व्‍यवस्‍था का एक उदाहरण दिया गया है।
इनपुट :– 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 97 take target charm 92 58.
चरण 1 :– 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take target charm 92 58.
चरण 2 :– target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take charm 92 58.
चरण 3 :– 92 target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take charm 58.
चरण 4 :– take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 charm 58.
चरण 5 :– 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is ramesh 48 charm 58.
चरण 6 :– ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is 48 charm 58.
चरण 7 :– 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is 48 charm.
चरण 8 :– is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 48 charm.
चरण 9 :– 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28 48 charm.
चरण 10 :– charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28 48.
चरण 11 :– 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28.
चरण 12 :– boy 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 28.
चरण 13 :– 28 boy 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97.
और चरण 13 इस इनपुट प्रक्रिया का अन्तिम चरण होगा।
उपरोक्‍त व्‍यवस्‍था क्रम का अनुसरण करते हुऐ निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।

इनपुट: Savita 25 86 42 the yam 31 16 94 is your in 18 app.
निम्‍नलिखित चरण उपरोक्‍त इनपुट का कौंनसा चरण होगा?
42 the 86 yam 94 your savita 25 31 16 is in 18 app.

नीचे दी गई सूचना को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढिए एवं उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्नों का उत्तर दीजिए –
किसी शब्‍द व्‍यवस्‍थापन मशीन को जब शब्‍दों की इनपुट लाइन दी जाती है, तो वह उन्‍हें हर चरण में एक विशेष नियम के तहत पुनर्व्‍यवस्थित करती हैं। नीचे इनपुट और उसकी पुनर्व्‍यवस्‍था का एक उदाहरण दिया गया है।
इनपुट :– 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 97 take target charm 92 58.
चरण 1 :– 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take target charm 92 58.
चरण 2 :– target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take charm 92 58.
चरण 3 :– 92 target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take charm 58.
चरण 4 :– take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 charm 58.
चरण 5 :– 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is ramesh 48 charm 58.
चरण 6 :– ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is 48 charm 58.
चरण 7 :– 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is 48 charm.
चरण 8 :– is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 48 charm.
चरण 9 :– 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28 48 charm.
चरण 10 :– charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28 48.
चरण 11 :– 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28.
चरण 12 :– boy 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 28.
चरण 13 :– 28 boy 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97.
और चरण 13 इस इनपुट प्रक्रिया का अन्तिम चरण होगा।
उपरोक्‍त व्‍यवस्‍था क्रम का अनुसरण करते हुऐ निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।

इनपुट:– 88 are his 92 school 37 52 61 from the right arm 12 29.
चरण IV में कौनसा शब्‍द/संख्‍या बायें से पॉंचवे स्‍थान पर होगा?

नीचे दी गई सूचना को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढिए एवं उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्नों का उत्तर दीजिए –
किसी शब्‍द व्‍यवस्‍थापन मशीन को जब शब्‍दों की इनपुट लाइन दी जाती है, तो वह उन्‍हें हर चरण में एक विशेष नियम के तहत पुनर्व्‍यवस्थित करती हैं। नीचे इनपुट और उसकी पुनर्व्‍यवस्‍था का एक उदाहरण दिया गया है।
इनपुट :– 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 97 take target charm 92 58.
चरण 1 :– 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take target charm 92 58.
चरण 2 :– target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take charm 92 58.
चरण 3 :– 92 target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take charm 58.
चरण 4 :– take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 charm 58.
चरण 5 :– 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is ramesh 48 charm 58.
चरण 6 :– ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is 48 charm 58.
चरण 7 :– 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is 48 charm.
चरण 8 :– is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 48 charm.
चरण 9 :– 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28 48 charm.
चरण 10 :– charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28 48.
चरण 11 :– 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28.
चरण 12 :– boy 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 28.
चरण 13 :– 28 boy 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97.
और चरण 13 इस इनपुट प्रक्रिया का अन्तिम चरण होगा।
उपरोक्‍त व्‍यवस्‍था क्रम का अनुसरण करते हुऐ निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।

इनपुट:– Raghu earn 13 32 45 86 for the step 36 89 12 far see.
चरण V में ‘step’ एवम् ’45’ के मध्‍य कुल कितने तत्‍व (शब्‍द एवम् संख्‍याऐं) होगी?

नीचे दी गई सूचना को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढिए एवं उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्नों का उत्तर दीजिए –
किसी शब्‍द व्‍यवस्‍थापन मशीन को जब शब्‍दों की इनपुट लाइन दी जाती है, तो वह उन्‍हें हर चरण में एक विशेष नियम के तहत पुनर्व्‍यवस्थित करती हैं। नीचे इनपुट और उसकी पुनर्व्‍यवस्‍था का एक उदाहरण दिया गया है।
इनपुट :– 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 97 take target charm 92 58.
चरण 1 :– 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take target charm 92 58.
चरण 2 :– target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take charm 92 58.
चरण 3 :– 92 target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 take charm 58.
चरण 4 :– take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 75 is ramesh 48 charm 58.
चरण 5 :– 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is ramesh 48 charm 58.
चरण 6 :– ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is 48 charm 58.
चरण 7 :– 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 is 48 charm.
चरण 8 :– is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 54 boy 28 48 charm.
चरण 9 :– 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28 48 charm.
चरण 10 :– charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28 48.
चरण 11 :– 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 boy 28.
चरण 12 :– boy 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97 28.
चरण 13 :– 28 boy 48 charm 54 is 58 ramesh 75 take 92 target 97.
और चरण 13 इस इनपुट प्रक्रिया का अन्तिम चरण होगा।
उपरोक्‍त व्‍यवस्‍था क्रम का अनुसरण करते हुऐ निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।

इनपुट : 28 16 31 mock now raj kite stop 71 81 92 rock.
निम्‍न में से कौनसा चरण VI में ‘rock’ की सही स्थिति को प्रदर्शित करता है?

निम्‍नलिखित पाई-चार्ट तथा तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादित किए गए दो उत्‍पादों के कुल उत्‍पादन का वितरण :

सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादन (दोनों उत्‍पादों को मिलाकर) की
कुल लागत = 50 करोड़ रु.
उत्‍पाद I तथा उत्‍पाद II के बीच उत्‍पादन का अनुपात तथा दो उत्‍पादों पर अर्जित किया गया लाभ प्रतिशत :

कम्‍पनी A, C तथा E को मिलाकर, उनके द्वारा उत्‍पाद II के उत्‍पादन का कुल लागत करोड़ रु. में कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित पाई-चार्ट तथा तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादित किए गए दो उत्‍पादों के कुल उत्‍पादन का वितरण :

सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादन (दोनों उत्‍पादों को मिलाकर) की
कुल लागत = 50 करोड़ रु.
उत्‍पाद I तथा उत्‍पाद II के बीच उत्‍पादन का अनुपात तथा दो उत्‍पादों पर अर्जित किया गया लाभ प्रतिशत :

उत्‍पाद – II पर कम्‍पनी D तथा G के द्वारा अर्जित लाभ की कुल राशि एवं उत्‍पाद – I पर कम्‍पनी B तथा F के द्वारा अर्जित लाभ की कुल राशि के बीच अनुपात कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित पाई-चार्ट तथा तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादित किए गए दो उत्‍पादों के कुल उत्‍पादन का वितरण :

सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादन (दोनों उत्‍पादों को मिलाकर) की
कुल लागत = 50 करोड़ रु.
उत्‍पाद I तथा उत्‍पाद II के बीच उत्‍पादन का अनुपात तथा दो उत्‍पादों पर अर्जित किया गया लाभ प्रतिशत :

कम्‍पनी C तथा G के द्वारा उत्‍पाद – I के उत्‍पादन की कुल लागत, कम्‍पनी E तथा F के द्वारा उत्‍पाद – II के उत्‍पादन की कुल लागत का लगभग कितना प्रतिशत है ?

निम्‍नलिखित पाई-चार्ट तथा तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादित किए गए दो उत्‍पादों के कुल उत्‍पादन का वितरण :

सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादन (दोनों उत्‍पादों को मिलाकर) की
कुल लागत = 50 करोड़ रु.
उत्‍पाद I तथा उत्‍पाद II के बीच उत्‍पादन का अनुपात तथा दो उत्‍पादों पर अर्जित किया गया लाभ प्रतिशत :

कम्‍पनी A, B, E तथा F के द्वारा उत्‍पाद – II पर अर्जित किया गया लाभ कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित पाई-चार्ट तथा तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादित किए गए दो उत्‍पादों के कुल उत्‍पादन का वितरण :

सात कम्‍पनियों के द्वारा उत्‍पादन (दोनों उत्‍पादों को मिलाकर) की
कुल लागत = 50 करोड़ रु.
उत्‍पाद I तथा उत्‍पाद II के बीच उत्‍पादन का अनुपात तथा दो उत्‍पादों पर अर्जित किया गया लाभ प्रतिशत :

उत्‍पाद – II पर कम्‍पनी B एवं D के द्वारा अर्जित कुल लाभ, उत्‍पाद – I पर कम्‍पनी C तथा G के द्वारा अर्जित कुल लाभ से कितना प्रतिशत अधिक या कम है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
छ: विभिन्‍न विषयों में 6 विद्यार्थियों के द्वारा प्राप्‍त अंकों का प्रतिशत :

पवन के द्वारा सभी विषयों में प्राप्‍त कुल अंक एवं गणेश के द्वारा सभी विषयों में प्राप्‍त कुल अंकों के बीच अंतर कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
छ: विभिन्‍न विषयों में 6 विद्यार्थियों के द्वारा प्राप्‍त अंकों का प्रतिशत :

मुकेश के द्वारा सभी विषयों में प्राप्‍त अंकों का सकल प्रतिशत एवं सभी विद्यार्थियों के द्वारा भौतिकी में प्राप्‍त अंकों के सकल प्रतिशत के बीच अनुपात कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
छ: विभिन्‍न विषयों में 6 विद्यार्थियों के द्वारा प्राप्‍त अंकों का प्रतिशत :

सतीश के द्वारा सभी विषयों में प्राप्‍त अंकों का सकल प्रतिशत तथा दिलीप के द्वारा सभी विषयों में प्राप्‍त अंकों के सकल प्रतिशत के बीच अन्‍तर कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
छ: विभिन्‍न विषयों में 6 विद्यार्थियों के द्वारा प्राप्‍त अंकों का प्रतिशत :

सभी विद्यार्थियों के द्वारा समाजशास्‍त्र में प्राप्‍त किये गये औसत अंक, मनोविज्ञान में सभी विद्यार्थियों के द्वारा प्राप्‍त किए गए औसत अंकों का लगभग कितना प्रतिशत है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
छ: विभिन्‍न विषयों में 6 विद्यार्थियों के द्वारा प्राप्‍त अंकों का प्रतिशत :

निखिल के द्वारा सभी विषयों में प्राप्‍त कुल अंक, गणेश के द्वारा अंग्रेजी, गणित तथा भौतिकी में प्राप्‍त अंकों एवं पवन के द्वारा रसायन, समाजशास्‍त्र तथा मनोविज्ञान में प्राप्‍त अंकों के कुल योग से कितना प्रतिशत अधिक या कम है ?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in bold to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions.

The Uri attacks have returned India-Pakistan relations to an old and familiar groove. India blames Pakistani terrorists. Pakistan denies the charge, instead proposing that India’s oppression in Kashmir fuelled the attack on the army camp. This clash of narratives is unlikely to end. But as India contemplates its response, it may be worthwhile to look at how the world of scholars is analysing the relationship between the Pakistani state and its non-state armed groups.

For a long time, it has been observed that many states defy Max Weber’s theory that modern states seek a monopoly over the means of coercion and do not allow non-state groups to use violence. We know that states often don’t crush armed organisations, even if they can; or they liquidate some groups while protecting others. In light of this larger problem, the key puzzle about Pakistan is: Should Pakistan’s relationship with non-state terror groups be viewed as simply an illustration of a larger problem that many states encounter, or is Pakistan sui generis with few relevant comparisons?

In a body of emerging work, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) argues that Pakistan is not the only country to have collaborated with non-state armed groups. The Indian state of Chhattisgarh protected and deployed a para-military group (SalwaJudum) against its Maoist insurgents, and Delhi collaborated with non-state groups to deal with the insurgents in the Northeast too. Similar examples can be cited from Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma’s Shan state etc. Yelena Biberman (Skidmore College), another scholar working on the outsourcing of security to non-state groups, argues roughly in the same vein, drawing comparisons between how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish rebels and how India used Ikhwan-ulMuslimoon in its counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Indeed, the problem is not only about collaboration. As we know, over the last few years, Pakistan has launched a brutal military assault against those terrorist groups that attack the Pakistani state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, but it has protected terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, or groups like the Afghan Taliban that violently seek to undermine the elected governments of Afghanistan. Staniland explores why this is so. The divergence is driven by two sets of factors: The ideological correspondence between the state and the armed group, and the operational utility of the armed organisation. By this logic, Pakistan would consistently support LeT and the Afghan Taliban because both of these organisations share the state’s ideology and are operationally strong, but its support for Jaish-e-Mohammed would be inconsistent, because the latter organisation also attacks Pakistani groups that have nothing to do with India, and the Pakistani army would wish to decimate the Pakistani Taliban because their target is the Pakistani state itself. Commitment to Islam is not the sole issue. Such a commitment must also be conjoined to a strong opposition to India and to the project of dominating Afghanistan.

This comparative argument about Pakistan is pitted against those who contend that Pakistan’s relationship with non-state actors is virtually unparalleled. In Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Christine Fair (Georgetown University) argues that Pakistan is ideology-driven, not security-driven. A standard security calculus, emphasising the primacy of national interest and a calibration of costs and benefits, would have demonstrated the necessity of compromise with India. But Fair writes: “For Pakistan’s men on horseback, not winning, even repeatedly, is not the same thing as losing. Simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition, defeat.”

Pakistan’s army sees victory, says Fair, simply “as the ability to continue fighting”, regardless of consequences for the nation’s development, welfare or international opinion. It is hard to find such states in history. Fair’s explanation of how Pakistan’s army distinguishes between good and bad terrorists is also different from Staniland’s. The bad ones are not only those who have turned against the Pakistani state and army, especially the Pakistani Taliban (as distinct from the Afghan Taliban), but also those who are inspired by the Deobandi religious tradition. The good terrorists, in contrast, are not only those opposed to India, but also ones inspired by the Al-Hadith tradition, which seeks Muslim unity and is not out to attack minority Muslim sects such as the Shias, or syncretistic Islamic groups such as the Sufis. Deobandiorganisations violently attack the latter groups as heretics or apostates, but Al-Hadith organisations, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, do not.

Whichever argument is correct, the implications are serious. The first implication is for the liberal approaches to understanding Pakistan.

Liberals have resolutely believed that enhancing people-to-people exchanges, experiencing cultural similarities and expanding trade with Pakistan would build the foundations of peace. It is not that such exchanges should be abandoned, but one should clearly see their limits. An argument about the re-discovery of a shared culture runs up against the very foundations of the Pakistani state.

In a famous exchange in the 1940s, Maulana Azad had argued that Pakistan was unnecessary because Muslims and Hindus, though religiously distinct, had the same Indian culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s argument was the opposite. Not only were Hindus and Muslims culturally distinct, but the preservation of Muslim culture, Jinnah said, required a separate state. It is Jinnah’s argument that became the basis for Pakistan. One can see why a discourse about cultural similarities can only threaten the state in Pakistan and its army will never allow it to become the dominant discourse. Maulana Azad can’t possibly become a Pakistani hero.

When anti-Indianism is constitutive, it can’t easily be expelled. That being so, should one believe that Pakistan’s army would give up its relationship with non-state terror groups that call India their incorrigible enemy? That can happen if such groups, to use Staniland’s argument, lose their operational utility. The strategic community in India may have to think seriously about how to make that happen. It would also help if Delhi repairs its relationship with Kashmir. Nothing lends greater strength to Pakistan’s army and terrorist organisations than unrest in Kashmir. Nothing lends greater unity to Pakistan’s deeply fractured polity and society than protests in Kashmir — not even Islam. Expected to be its cultural glue, Islam has actually been Pakistan’s source of interminable religious conflict.

Why could Maulana Abul Kalam Azad not had received much recognition in Pakistan?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in bold to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions.

The Uri attacks have returned India-Pakistan relations to an old and familiar groove. India blames Pakistani terrorists. Pakistan denies the charge, instead proposing that India’s oppression in Kashmir fuelled the attack on the army camp. This clash of narratives is unlikely to end. But as India contemplates its response, it may be worthwhile to look at how the world of scholars is analysing the relationship between the Pakistani state and its non-state armed groups.

For a long time, it has been observed that many states defy Max Weber’s theory that modern states seek a monopoly over the means of coercion and do not allow non-state groups to use violence. We know that states often don’t crush armed organisations, even if they can; or they liquidate some groups while protecting others. In light of this larger problem, the key puzzle about Pakistan is: Should Pakistan’s relationship with non-state terror groups be viewed as simply an illustration of a larger problem that many states encounter, or is Pakistan sui generis with few relevant comparisons?

In a body of emerging work, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) argues that Pakistan is not the only country to have collaborated with non-state armed groups. The Indian state of Chhattisgarh protected and deployed a para-military group (SalwaJudum) against its Maoist insurgents, and Delhi collaborated with non-state groups to deal with the insurgents in the Northeast too. Similar examples can be cited from Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma’s Shan state etc. Yelena Biberman (Skidmore College), another scholar working on the outsourcing of security to non-state groups, argues roughly in the same vein, drawing comparisons between how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish rebels and how India used Ikhwan-ulMuslimoon in its counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Indeed, the problem is not only about collaboration. As we know, over the last few years, Pakistan has launched a brutal military assault against those terrorist groups that attack the Pakistani state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, but it has protected terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, or groups like the Afghan Taliban that violently seek to undermine the elected governments of Afghanistan. Staniland explores why this is so. The divergence is driven by two sets of factors: The ideological correspondence between the state and the armed group, and the operational utility of the armed organisation. By this logic, Pakistan would consistently support LeT and the Afghan Taliban because both of these organisations share the state’s ideology and are operationally strong, but its support for Jaish-e-Mohammed would be inconsistent, because the latter organisation also attacks Pakistani groups that have nothing to do with India, and the Pakistani army would wish to decimate the Pakistani Taliban because their target is the Pakistani state itself. Commitment to Islam is not the sole issue. Such a commitment must also be conjoined to a strong opposition to India and to the project of dominating Afghanistan.

This comparative argument about Pakistan is pitted against those who contend that Pakistan’s relationship with non-state actors is virtually unparalleled. In Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Christine Fair (Georgetown University) argues that Pakistan is ideology-driven, not security-driven. A standard security calculus, emphasising the primacy of national interest and a calibration of costs and benefits, would have demonstrated the necessity of compromise with India. But Fair writes: “For Pakistan’s men on horseback, not winning, even repeatedly, is not the same thing as losing. Simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition, defeat.”

Pakistan’s army sees victory, says Fair, simply “as the ability to continue fighting”, regardless of consequences for the nation’s development, welfare or international opinion. It is hard to find such states in history. Fair’s explanation of how Pakistan’s army distinguishes between good and bad terrorists is also different from Staniland’s. The bad ones are not only those who have turned against the Pakistani state and army, especially the Pakistani Taliban (as distinct from the Afghan Taliban), but also those who are inspired by the Deobandi religious tradition. The good terrorists, in contrast, are not only those opposed to India, but also ones inspired by the Al-Hadith tradition, which seeks Muslim unity and is not out to attack minority Muslim sects such as the Shias, or syncretistic Islamic groups such as the Sufis. Deobandiorganisations violently attack the latter groups as heretics or apostates, but Al-Hadith organisations, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, do not.

Whichever argument is correct, the implications are serious. The first implication is for the liberal approaches to understanding Pakistan.

Liberals have resolutely believed that enhancing people-to-people exchanges, experiencing cultural similarities and expanding trade with Pakistan would build the foundations of peace. It is not that such exchanges should be abandoned, but one should clearly see their limits. An argument about the re-discovery of a shared culture runs up against the very foundations of the Pakistani state.

In a famous exchange in the 1940s, Maulana Azad had argued that Pakistan was unnecessary because Muslims and Hindus, though religiously distinct, had the same Indian culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s argument was the opposite. Not only were Hindus and Muslims culturally distinct, but the preservation of Muslim culture, Jinnah said, required a separate state. It is Jinnah’s argument that became the basis for Pakistan. One can see why a discourse about cultural similarities can only threaten the state in Pakistan and its army will never allow it to become the dominant discourse. Maulana Azad can’t possibly become a Pakistani hero.

When anti-Indianism is constitutive, it can’t easily be expelled. That being so, should one believe that Pakistan’s army would give up its relationship with non-state terror groups that call India their incorrigible enemy? That can happen if such groups, to use Staniland’s argument, lose their operational utility. The strategic community in India may have to think seriously about how to make that happen. It would also help if Delhi repairs its relationship with Kashmir. Nothing lends greater strength to Pakistan’s army and terrorist organisations than unrest in Kashmir. Nothing lends greater unity to Pakistan’s deeply fractured polity and society than protests in Kashmir — not even Islam. Expected to be its cultural glue, Islam has actually been Pakistan’s source of interminable religious conflict.

According to the passage, what do you understand by armed state or non-state organization?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in bold to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions.

The Uri attacks have returned India-Pakistan relations to an old and familiar groove. India blames Pakistani terrorists. Pakistan denies the charge, instead proposing that India’s oppression in Kashmir fuelled the attack on the army camp. This clash of narratives is unlikely to end. But as India contemplates its response, it may be worthwhile to look at how the world of scholars is analysing the relationship between the Pakistani state and its non-state armed groups.

For a long time, it has been observed that many states defy Max Weber’s theory that modern states seek a monopoly over the means of coercion and do not allow non-state groups to use violence. We know that states often don’t crush armed organisations, even if they can; or they liquidate some groups while protecting others. In light of this larger problem, the key puzzle about Pakistan is: Should Pakistan’s relationship with non-state terror groups be viewed as simply an illustration of a larger problem that many states encounter, or is Pakistan sui generis with few relevant comparisons?

In a body of emerging work, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) argues that Pakistan is not the only country to have collaborated with non-state armed groups. The Indian state of Chhattisgarh protected and deployed a para-military group (SalwaJudum) against its Maoist insurgents, and Delhi collaborated with non-state groups to deal with the insurgents in the Northeast too. Similar examples can be cited from Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma’s Shan state etc. Yelena Biberman (Skidmore College), another scholar working on the outsourcing of security to non-state groups, argues roughly in the same vein, drawing comparisons between how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish rebels and how India used Ikhwan-ulMuslimoon in its counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Indeed, the problem is not only about collaboration. As we know, over the last few years, Pakistan has launched a brutal military assault against those terrorist groups that attack the Pakistani state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, but it has protected terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, or groups like the Afghan Taliban that violently seek to undermine the elected governments of Afghanistan. Staniland explores why this is so. The divergence is driven by two sets of factors: The ideological correspondence between the state and the armed group, and the operational utility of the armed organisation. By this logic, Pakistan would consistently support LeT and the Afghan Taliban because both of these organisations share the state’s ideology and are operationally strong, but its support for Jaish-e-Mohammed would be inconsistent, because the latter organisation also attacks Pakistani groups that have nothing to do with India, and the Pakistani army would wish to decimate the Pakistani Taliban because their target is the Pakistani state itself. Commitment to Islam is not the sole issue. Such a commitment must also be conjoined to a strong opposition to India and to the project of dominating Afghanistan.

This comparative argument about Pakistan is pitted against those who contend that Pakistan’s relationship with non-state actors is virtually unparalleled. In Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Christine Fair (Georgetown University) argues that Pakistan is ideology-driven, not security-driven. A standard security calculus, emphasising the primacy of national interest and a calibration of costs and benefits, would have demonstrated the necessity of compromise with India. But Fair writes: “For Pakistan’s men on horseback, not winning, even repeatedly, is not the same thing as losing. Simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition, defeat.”

Pakistan’s army sees victory, says Fair, simply “as the ability to continue fighting”, regardless of consequences for the nation’s development, welfare or international opinion. It is hard to find such states in history. Fair’s explanation of how Pakistan’s army distinguishes between good and bad terrorists is also different from Staniland’s. The bad ones are not only those who have turned against the Pakistani state and army, especially the Pakistani Taliban (as distinct from the Afghan Taliban), but also those who are inspired by the Deobandi religious tradition. The good terrorists, in contrast, are not only those opposed to India, but also ones inspired by the Al-Hadith tradition, which seeks Muslim unity and is not out to attack minority Muslim sects such as the Shias, or syncretistic Islamic groups such as the Sufis. Deobandiorganisations violently attack the latter groups as heretics or apostates, but Al-Hadith organisations, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, do not.

Whichever argument is correct, the implications are serious. The first implication is for the liberal approaches to understanding Pakistan.

Liberals have resolutely believed that enhancing people-to-people exchanges, experiencing cultural similarities and expanding trade with Pakistan would build the foundations of peace. It is not that such exchanges should be abandoned, but one should clearly see their limits. An argument about the re-discovery of a shared culture runs up against the very foundations of the Pakistani state.

In a famous exchange in the 1940s, Maulana Azad had argued that Pakistan was unnecessary because Muslims and Hindus, though religiously distinct, had the same Indian culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s argument was the opposite. Not only were Hindus and Muslims culturally distinct, but the preservation of Muslim culture, Jinnah said, required a separate state. It is Jinnah’s argument that became the basis for Pakistan. One can see why a discourse about cultural similarities can only threaten the state in Pakistan and its army will never allow it to become the dominant discourse. Maulana Azad can’t possibly become a Pakistani hero.

When anti-Indianism is constitutive, it can’t easily be expelled. That being so, should one believe that Pakistan’s army would give up its relationship with non-state terror groups that call India their incorrigible enemy? That can happen if such groups, to use Staniland’s argument, lose their operational utility. The strategic community in India may have to think seriously about how to make that happen. It would also help if Delhi repairs its relationship with Kashmir. Nothing lends greater strength to Pakistan’s army and terrorist organisations than unrest in Kashmir. Nothing lends greater unity to Pakistan’s deeply fractured polity and society than protests in Kashmir — not even Islam. Expected to be its cultural glue, Islam has actually been Pakistan’s source of interminable religious conflict.

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in bold to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions.

The Uri attacks have returned India-Pakistan relations to an old and familiar groove. India blames Pakistani terrorists. Pakistan denies the charge, instead proposing that India’s oppression in Kashmir fuelled the attack on the army camp. This clash of narratives is unlikely to end. But as India contemplates its response, it may be worthwhile to look at how the world of scholars is analysing the relationship between the Pakistani state and its non-state armed groups.

For a long time, it has been observed that many states defy Max Weber’s theory that modern states seek a monopoly over the means of coercion and do not allow non-state groups to use violence. We know that states often don’t crush armed organisations, even if they can; or they liquidate some groups while protecting others. In light of this larger problem, the key puzzle about Pakistan is: Should Pakistan’s relationship with non-state terror groups be viewed as simply an illustration of a larger problem that many states encounter, or is Pakistan sui generis with few relevant comparisons?

In a body of emerging work, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) argues that Pakistan is not the only country to have collaborated with non-state armed groups. The Indian state of Chhattisgarh protected and deployed a para-military group (SalwaJudum) against its Maoist insurgents, and Delhi collaborated with non-state groups to deal with the insurgents in the Northeast too. Similar examples can be cited from Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma’s Shan state etc. Yelena Biberman (Skidmore College), another scholar working on the outsourcing of security to non-state groups, argues roughly in the same vein, drawing comparisons between how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish rebels and how India used Ikhwan-ulMuslimoon in its counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Indeed, the problem is not only about collaboration. As we know, over the last few years, Pakistan has launched a brutal military assault against those terrorist groups that attack the Pakistani state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, but it has protected terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, or groups like the Afghan Taliban that violently seek to undermine the elected governments of Afghanistan. Staniland explores why this is so. The divergence is driven by two sets of factors: The ideological correspondence between the state and the armed group, and the operational utility of the armed organisation. By this logic, Pakistan would consistently support LeT and the Afghan Taliban because both of these organisations share the state’s ideology and are operationally strong, but its support for Jaish-e-Mohammed would be inconsistent, because the latter organisation also attacks Pakistani groups that have nothing to do with India, and the Pakistani army would wish to decimate the Pakistani Taliban because their target is the Pakistani state itself. Commitment to Islam is not the sole issue. Such a commitment must also be conjoined to a strong opposition to India and to the project of dominating Afghanistan.

This comparative argument about Pakistan is pitted against those who contend that Pakistan’s relationship with non-state actors is virtually unparalleled. In Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Christine Fair (Georgetown University) argues that Pakistan is ideology-driven, not security-driven. A standard security calculus, emphasising the primacy of national interest and a calibration of costs and benefits, would have demonstrated the necessity of compromise with India. But Fair writes: “For Pakistan’s men on horseback, not winning, even repeatedly, is not the same thing as losing. Simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition, defeat.”

Pakistan’s army sees victory, says Fair, simply “as the ability to continue fighting”, regardless of consequences for the nation’s development, welfare or international opinion. It is hard to find such states in history. Fair’s explanation of how Pakistan’s army distinguishes between good and bad terrorists is also different from Staniland’s. The bad ones are not only those who have turned against the Pakistani state and army, especially the Pakistani Taliban (as distinct from the Afghan Taliban), but also those who are inspired by the Deobandi religious tradition. The good terrorists, in contrast, are not only those opposed to India, but also ones inspired by the Al-Hadith tradition, which seeks Muslim unity and is not out to attack minority Muslim sects such as the Shias, or syncretistic Islamic groups such as the Sufis. Deobandiorganisations violently attack the latter groups as heretics or apostates, but Al-Hadith organisations, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, do not.

Whichever argument is correct, the implications are serious. The first implication is for the liberal approaches to understanding Pakistan.

Liberals have resolutely believed that enhancing people-to-people exchanges, experiencing cultural similarities and expanding trade with Pakistan would build the foundations of peace. It is not that such exchanges should be abandoned, but one should clearly see their limits. An argument about the re-discovery of a shared culture runs up against the very foundations of the Pakistani state.

In a famous exchange in the 1940s, Maulana Azad had argued that Pakistan was unnecessary because Muslims and Hindus, though religiously distinct, had the same Indian culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s argument was the opposite. Not only were Hindus and Muslims culturally distinct, but the preservation of Muslim culture, Jinnah said, required a separate state. It is Jinnah’s argument that became the basis for Pakistan. One can see why a discourse about cultural similarities can only threaten the state in Pakistan and its army will never allow it to become the dominant discourse. Maulana Azad can’t possibly become a Pakistani hero.

When anti-Indianism is constitutive, it can’t easily be expelled. That being so, should one believe that Pakistan’s army would give up its relationship with non-state terror groups that call India their incorrigible enemy? That can happen if such groups, to use Staniland’s argument, lose their operational utility. The strategic community in India may have to think seriously about how to make that happen. It would also help if Delhi repairs its relationship with Kashmir. Nothing lends greater strength to Pakistan’s army and terrorist organisations than unrest in Kashmir. Nothing lends greater unity to Pakistan’s deeply fractured polity and society than protests in Kashmir — not even Islam. Expected to be its cultural glue, Islam has actually been Pakistan’s source of interminable religious conflict.

Choose the word/group of words which is MOST SIMILAR in meaning to the word/group of words printed in bold as used in the passage.

Incorrigible

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in bold to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions.

The Uri attacks have returned India-Pakistan relations to an old and familiar groove. India blames Pakistani terrorists. Pakistan denies the charge, instead proposing that India’s oppression in Kashmir fuelled the attack on the army camp. This clash of narratives is unlikely to end. But as India contemplates its response, it may be worthwhile to look at how the world of scholars is analysing the relationship between the Pakistani state and its non-state armed groups.

For a long time, it has been observed that many states defy Max Weber’s theory that modern states seek a monopoly over the means of coercion and do not allow non-state groups to use violence. We know that states often don’t crush armed organisations, even if they can; or they liquidate some groups while protecting others. In light of this larger problem, the key puzzle about Pakistan is: Should Pakistan’s relationship with non-state terror groups be viewed as simply an illustration of a larger problem that many states encounter, or is Pakistan sui generis with few relevant comparisons?

In a body of emerging work, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) argues that Pakistan is not the only country to have collaborated with non-state armed groups. The Indian state of Chhattisgarh protected and deployed a para-military group (SalwaJudum) against its Maoist insurgents, and Delhi collaborated with non-state groups to deal with the insurgents in the Northeast too. Similar examples can be cited from Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma’s Shan state etc. Yelena Biberman (Skidmore College), another scholar working on the outsourcing of security to non-state groups, argues roughly in the same vein, drawing comparisons between how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish rebels and how India used Ikhwan-ulMuslimoon in its counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Indeed, the problem is not only about collaboration. As we know, over the last few years, Pakistan has launched a brutal military assault against those terrorist groups that attack the Pakistani state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, but it has protected terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, or groups like the Afghan Taliban that violently seek to undermine the elected governments of Afghanistan. Staniland explores why this is so. The divergence is driven by two sets of factors: The ideological correspondence between the state and the armed group, and the operational utility of the armed organisation. By this logic, Pakistan would consistently support LeT and the Afghan Taliban because both of these organisations share the state’s ideology and are operationally strong, but its support for Jaish-e-Mohammed would be inconsistent, because the latter organisation also attacks Pakistani groups that have nothing to do with India, and the Pakistani army would wish to decimate the Pakistani Taliban because their target is the Pakistani state itself. Commitment to Islam is not the sole issue. Such a commitment must also be conjoined to a strong opposition to India and to the project of dominating Afghanistan.

This comparative argument about Pakistan is pitted against those who contend that Pakistan’s relationship with non-state actors is virtually unparalleled. In Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Christine Fair (Georgetown University) argues that Pakistan is ideology-driven, not security-driven. A standard security calculus, emphasising the primacy of national interest and a calibration of costs and benefits, would have demonstrated the necessity of compromise with India. But Fair writes: “For Pakistan’s men on horseback, not winning, even repeatedly, is not the same thing as losing. Simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition, defeat.”

Pakistan’s army sees victory, says Fair, simply “as the ability to continue fighting”, regardless of consequences for the nation’s development, welfare or international opinion. It is hard to find such states in history. Fair’s explanation of how Pakistan’s army distinguishes between good and bad terrorists is also different from Staniland’s. The bad ones are not only those who have turned against the Pakistani state and army, especially the Pakistani Taliban (as distinct from the Afghan Taliban), but also those who are inspired by the Deobandi religious tradition. The good terrorists, in contrast, are not only those opposed to India, but also ones inspired by the Al-Hadith tradition, which seeks Muslim unity and is not out to attack minority Muslim sects such as the Shias, or syncretistic Islamic groups such as the Sufis. Deobandiorganisations violently attack the latter groups as heretics or apostates, but Al-Hadith organisations, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, do not.

Whichever argument is correct, the implications are serious. The first implication is for the liberal approaches to understanding Pakistan.

Liberals have resolutely believed that enhancing people-to-people exchanges, experiencing cultural similarities and expanding trade with Pakistan would build the foundations of peace. It is not that such exchanges should be abandoned, but one should clearly see their limits. An argument about the re-discovery of a shared culture runs up against the very foundations of the Pakistani state.

In a famous exchange in the 1940s, Maulana Azad had argued that Pakistan was unnecessary because Muslims and Hindus, though religiously distinct, had the same Indian culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s argument was the opposite. Not only were Hindus and Muslims culturally distinct, but the preservation of Muslim culture, Jinnah said, required a separate state. It is Jinnah’s argument that became the basis for Pakistan. One can see why a discourse about cultural similarities can only threaten the state in Pakistan and its army will never allow it to become the dominant discourse. Maulana Azad can’t possibly become a Pakistani hero.

When anti-Indianism is constitutive, it can’t easily be expelled. That being so, should one believe that Pakistan’s army would give up its relationship with non-state terror groups that call India their incorrigible enemy? That can happen if such groups, to use Staniland’s argument, lose their operational utility. The strategic community in India may have to think seriously about how to make that happen. It would also help if Delhi repairs its relationship with Kashmir. Nothing lends greater strength to Pakistan’s army and terrorist organisations than unrest in Kashmir. Nothing lends greater unity to Pakistan’s deeply fractured polity and society than protests in Kashmir — not even Islam. Expected to be its cultural glue, Islam has actually been Pakistan’s source of interminable religious conflict.

Choose the word/group of words which is MOST SIMILAR in meaning to the word/group of words printed in bold as used in the passage.

Contemplates

Five statements are given below, labelled a, b, c, and e. Among these, four statements are in logical order and form coherent paragraph. From the given options, choose the option that does not fit into the theme of the paragraph.

Five statements are given below, labelled a, b, c, and e. Among these, four statements are in logical order and form coherent paragraph. From the given options, choose the option that does not fit into the theme of the paragraph.

Five statements are given below, labelled a, b, c, and e. Among these, four statements are in logical order and form coherent paragraph. From the given options, choose the option that does not fit into the theme of the paragraph.

Five statements are given below, labelled a, b, c, and e. Among these, four statements are in logical order and form coherent paragraph. From the given options, choose the option that does not fit into the theme of the paragraph.

Five statements are given below, labelled a, b, c, and e. Among these, four statements are in logical order and form coherent paragraph. From the given options, choose the option that does not fit into the theme of the paragraph.

स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इंडिया अपने पांच सहयोगी बैंकों को 1 अप्रैल से अपने साथ मिलाकर विश्व में _____सबसे बड़ा बैंक बन जायेगा?

हाल ही में भारत की पहली बायो गैस बस किस शहर में शुरू की गई?

किशोरी आमोनकर का हाल ही में निधन हो गया। वह कौन थी?

पुरुषों और महिलाओं के लिए समान भुगतान कानून बनाने वाला पहला देश कौन सा होगा?

किस आयोग की सिफारिशों पर, भारतीय रिजर्व बैंक की स्थापना हुई थी?

हाल में, किस देश ने आधिकारिक तौर पर बिटकॉइन को मुद्रा के रूप में मान्यता दी है?

2018 के लिए विज्डन लीडिंग क्रिकेटर इन द वर्ल्ड किसे चुना गया है?

केंद्रीय उत्पाद एवं सीमा शुल्क बोर्ड का नया नाम क्या होगा?

निम्नलिखित में से कौन सा देश हाल ही में एक सहयोगी सदस्य के रूप में अंतर्राष्ट्रीय ऊर्जा एजेंसी में शामिल हुआ है?

‘ब्लू रिवोल्यूशन’ किससे संबंधित है?

भारत ने किस साल तक टीबी को समाप्त करने के लिए डब्लूएचओ के साथ एक ‘कॉल फॉर एक्शन’ पर हस्ताक्षर किया है?

किस देश में जी -20 के वित्त मंत्रियों और सेंट्रल बैंक के गवर्नर्स की बैठक हो रही है?

वर्ल्ड हैप्पीनेस रिपोर्ट 2018 में भारत की रैंक क्या है?

उत्तराखंड उच्च न्यायालय ने हाल ही में कौन सी नदियों को जीवित इकाई घोषित कर दिया है?

किस टीम ने विजय हजारे ट्रॉफी 2018 जीती है?