SBI PO Mains Online Test in Hindi Series 1, SBI Mains Mock Test 2019

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए–
L, M, N, O, X, Y एवम् Z एक परिवार के सात सदस्‍य है ये भारतीय वायु सेना से सम्‍बन्‍ध रखते है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक एक अलग रैंक जैसे – ग्रुप कैप्‍टन, सिपाही, स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर, विंग कमाण्‍डर, फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर, लेफ्टिनेंट एवम् एयर वाइस मार्शल पर है किन्‍तु आवश्‍यक नहीं कि इसी क्रम में। यहाँ तीन महिला सदस्‍य है। कोई भी महिला ग्रूप कैप्‍टन या सिपाही नहीं है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक अलग – अलग मासिक वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। सिपाही सर्वाधिक वेतन पाता है। O, जो कि लेफ्टिनेंट है, की आय Y से कम है जो कि एयर वाइस मार्शल है। फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर N, L से अधिक किन्‍तु O से कम वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। Z, की पत्‍नी की आय सबसे कम है। स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर X एक अविवाहित महिला है। एवम् वह L से कम और M से अधिक कमाती है। ग्रूप कैप्‍टन की आय सबसे कम नहीं है।

निम्‍न में से कौनसा कथन सत्‍य है?

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए–
L, M, N, O, X, Y एवम् Z एक परिवार के सात सदस्‍य है ये भारतीय वायु सेना से सम्‍बन्‍ध रखते है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक एक अलग रैंक जैसे – ग्रुप कैप्‍टन, सिपाही, स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर, विंग कमाण्‍डर, फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर, लेफ्टिनेंट एवम् एयर वाइस मार्शल पर है किन्‍तु आवश्‍यक नहीं कि इसी क्रम में। यहाँ तीन महिला सदस्‍य है। कोई भी महिला ग्रूप कैप्‍टन या सिपाही नहीं है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक अलग – अलग मासिक वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। सिपाही सर्वाधिक वेतन पाता है। O, जो कि लेफ्टिनेंट है, की आय Y से कम है जो कि एयर वाइस मार्शल है। फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर N, L से अधिक किन्‍तु O से कम वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। Z, की पत्‍नी की आय सबसे कम है। स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर X एक अविवाहित महिला है। एवम् वह L से कम और M से अधिक कमाती है। ग्रूप कैप्‍टन की आय सबसे कम नहीं है।

प्रोफेशन के निम्‍न युग्‍मों में से कौनसा युग्‍म पति एवम् पत्‍नी के प्रोफेशन को दर्शाता है?

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए–
L, M, N, O, X, Y एवम् Z एक परिवार के सात सदस्‍य है ये भारतीय वायु सेना से सम्‍बन्‍ध रखते है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक एक अलग रैंक जैसे – ग्रुप कैप्‍टन, सिपाही, स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर, विंग कमाण्‍डर, फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर, लेफ्टिनेंट एवम् एयर वाइस मार्शल पर है किन्‍तु आवश्‍यक नहीं कि इसी क्रम में। यहाँ तीन महिला सदस्‍य है। कोई भी महिला ग्रूप कैप्‍टन या सिपाही नहीं है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक अलग – अलग मासिक वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। सिपाही सर्वाधिक वेतन पाता है। O, जो कि लेफ्टिनेंट है, की आय Y से कम है जो कि एयर वाइस मार्शल है। फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर N, L से अधिक किन्‍तु O से कम वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। Z, की पत्‍नी की आय सबसे कम है। स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर X एक अविवाहित महिला है। एवम् वह L से कम और M से अधिक कमाती है। ग्रूप कैप्‍टन की आय सबसे कम नहीं है।

निम्‍न में से कौन तीनों महिला सदस्‍यों को दर्शाता है?

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए–
L, M, N, O, X, Y एवम् Z एक परिवार के सात सदस्‍य है ये भारतीय वायु सेना से सम्‍बन्‍ध रखते है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक एक अलग रैंक जैसे – ग्रुप कैप्‍टन, सिपाही, स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर, विंग कमाण्‍डर, फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर, लेफ्टिनेंट एवम् एयर वाइस मार्शल पर है किन्‍तु आवश्‍यक नहीं कि इसी क्रम में। यहाँ तीन महिला सदस्‍य है। कोई भी महिला ग्रूप कैप्‍टन या सिपाही नहीं है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक अलग – अलग मासिक वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। सिपाही सर्वाधिक वेतन पाता है। O, जो कि लेफ्टिनेंट है, की आय Y से कम है जो कि एयर वाइस मार्शल है। फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर N, L से अधिक किन्‍तु O से कम वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। Z, की पत्‍नी की आय सबसे कम है। स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर X एक अविवाहित महिला है। एवम् वह L से कम और M से अधिक कमाती है। ग्रूप कैप्‍टन की आय सबसे कम नहीं है।

कितने सदस्‍यों की आय O से अधिक है?

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए–
L, M, N, O, X, Y एवम् Z एक परिवार के सात सदस्‍य है ये भारतीय वायु सेना से सम्‍बन्‍ध रखते है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक एक अलग रैंक जैसे – ग्रुप कैप्‍टन, सिपाही, स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर, विंग कमाण्‍डर, फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर, लेफ्टिनेंट एवम् एयर वाइस मार्शल पर है किन्‍तु आवश्‍यक नहीं कि इसी क्रम में। यहाँ तीन महिला सदस्‍य है। कोई भी महिला ग्रूप कैप्‍टन या सिपाही नहीं है। इनमें से प्रत्‍येक अलग – अलग मासिक वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। सिपाही सर्वाधिक वेतन पाता है। O, जो कि लेफ्टिनेंट है, की आय Y से कम है जो कि एयर वाइस मार्शल है। फ्लाइंग ऑफिसर N, L से अधिक किन्‍तु O से कम वेतन प्राप्‍त करता है। Z, की पत्‍नी की आय सबसे कम है। स्‍क्‍वाड्रन लीडर X एक अविवाहित महिला है। एवम् वह L से कम और M से अधिक कमाती है। ग्रूप कैप्‍टन की आय सबसे कम नहीं है।

कितने सदस्‍य क्रमश: ग्रूप कमाण्‍डर से अधिक एवम् N से कम कमाते है?

निम्‍न सूचना का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।
एक सांकेतिक भाषा में कुछ कथन निम्‍न रूप से कोडित किये गये है।
‘square should common region’ को ’79HW6 73XM6 68IM6 81HV6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘triangle should outside circle’ को ’93LV7 50XV6 79HW6 86GV8′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘common valid outside choise’ को ’59XV6 93LV7 48EW5 73XM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘urban region may under trust’ को ’98GG5 62FI5 39NB3 56FM5 68IM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।

‘circle’ का कोड प्राप्‍त करने के लिए निम्‍न में से कौनसे कोड उपयोग में लिये जा सकते है?
(i) 79HW6 93LV7 86GV8 68IM6
(ii) 59XV6 39NB3 68IM6 98GG5
(iii) 50XV6 81HV6 73XM6 79HW6
(iii) 62FI5 48EW5 73XM6 86GV8

निम्‍न सूचना का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।
एक सांकेतिक भाषा में कुछ कथन निम्‍न रूप से कोडित किये गये है।
‘square should common region’ को ’79HW6 73XM6 68IM6 81HV6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘triangle should outside circle’ को ’93LV7 50XV6 79HW6 86GV8′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘common valid outside choise’ को ’59XV6 93LV7 48EW5 73XM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘urban region may under trust’ को ’98GG5 62FI5 39NB3 56FM5 68IM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।

निम्‍न में से कौनसा विकल्‍प ‘square’ का कोड प्राप्‍त करने के लिए आवश्‍यक है?
(i) 68IM5 81HV6 73XM6 79HW6
(ii) 50XV6 931V7 79HW6 86GV8
(iii) 59XV6 93LV7 48EW5 73XM6
(iv) 98GG5 62FI5 39NB2 56FM5
(v) 39NB2 48EW5 79HW6 68IM5

निम्‍न सूचना का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।
एक सांकेतिक भाषा में कुछ कथन निम्‍न रूप से कोडित किये गये है।
‘square should common region’ को ’79HW6 73XM6 68IM6 81HV6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘triangle should outside circle’ को ’93LV7 50XV6 79HW6 86GV8′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘common valid outside choise’ को ’59XV6 93LV7 48EW5 73XM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘urban region may under trust’ को ’98GG5 62FI5 39NB3 56FM5 68IM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।

‘square’ का कोड प्राप्‍त करने के लिए निम्‍न में से कौनसे कोड उपयोग में लिये जायेगे?

निम्‍न सूचना का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।
एक सांकेतिक भाषा में कुछ कथन निम्‍न रूप से कोडित किये गये है।
‘square should common region’ को ’79HW6 73XM6 68IM6 81HV6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘triangle should outside circle’ को ’93LV7 50XV6 79HW6 86GV8′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘common valid outside choise’ को ’59XV6 93LV7 48EW5 73XM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘urban region may under trust’ को ’98GG5 62FI5 39NB3 56FM5 68IM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।

निम्‍न में से कौनसा युग्‍म सही नहीं है?

निम्‍न सूचना का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।
एक सांकेतिक भाषा में कुछ कथन निम्‍न रूप से कोडित किये गये है।
‘square should common region’ को ’79HW6 73XM6 68IM6 81HV6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘triangle should outside circle’ को ’93LV7 50XV6 79HW6 86GV8′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘common valid outside choise’ को ’59XV6 93LV7 48EW5 73XM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘urban region may under trust’ को ’98GG5 62FI5 39NB3 56FM5 68IM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।

’73XM6′ किसके लिए प्रयुक्‍त हुआ है?

निम्‍न सूचना का सावधानीपूर्वक अध्‍ययन कीजिए एवम् दिये गये प्रश्‍नों का उत्‍तर दीजिए।
एक सांकेतिक भाषा में कुछ कथन निम्‍न रूप से कोडित किये गये है।
‘square should common region’ को ’79HW6 73XM6 68IM6 81HV6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘triangle should outside circle’ को ’93LV7 50XV6 79HW6 86GV8′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘common valid outside choise’ को ’59XV6 93LV7 48EW5 73XM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।
‘urban region may under trust’ को ’98GG5 62FI5 39NB3 56FM5 68IM6′ के रूप में कोडित किया है।

यदि ‘triangle’ को कोड भाषा में ’86GV8′ लिखा जाता है, तो इस कोडिंग भाषा में ‘circle’ को कैंसे लिखा जा सकेगा?

नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में कुछ कथन दिये गये है एवं उनके नीचे कुछ निष्‍कर्ष दिये गये है। आपको दिये गये कथनों को सत्‍य मानना है, भले ही वे सर्वज्ञात तथ्‍यों से भिन्‍न प्रतीत होते हों। सभी निष्‍कर्षों को पढिये फिर तय कीजिए कि दिया गया कौनसा निष्‍कर्ष कथनों का तार्किक रूप से सही अनुसरण करता है, भले ही सर्वज्ञात तथ्‍य कुछ भ्‍ाी हों।
कथन:– कोई अपार्टमेंट इमारत नहीं है। कोई कुर्सी उपवन नहीं है। कुछ बोतल इमारत है। सभी बाल्टियॉं उपवन है।
सभी इमारतें कुर्सियॉं है।
निष्‍कर्ष: I. कुछ अपार्टमेंट का बोतल होना एक सम्‍भावना है।
II. कम से कम कुछ उपवन बोतल हो सकते है।
III. सभी बाल्टियों का बोतल होना एक सम्‍भावना है।
IV. कोई उपवन अपार्टमेंट नहीं है।

नीचे दिये गये प्रश्‍न में कुछ कथन दिये गये है एवं उनके नीचे कुछ निष्‍कर्ष दिये गये है। आपको दिये गये कथनों को सत्‍य मानना है, भले ही वे सर्वज्ञात तथ्‍यों से भिन्‍न प्रतीत होते हों। सभी निष्‍कर्षों को पढिये फिर तय कीजिए कि दिया गया कौनसा निष्‍कर्ष कथनों का तार्किक रूप से सही अनुसरण करता है, भले ही सर्वज्ञात तथ्‍य कुछ भ्‍ाी हों।

कथन:– कुछ कथन तर्क नहीं हैै। कुछ निष्‍कर्ष सत्‍य नहीं है। सभी अक्षर वाक्‍य है। कुछ तर्क वाक्‍य है। सभी निष्‍कर्ष अक्षर है।
निष्‍कर्ष:– I. सभी सत्‍य तर्क हो सकता है।
II. कम से कम कुछ तर्क निष्‍कर्ष है।
III. वे सभी सत्‍य जो अक्षर है कथन भी हो सकते है।
IV. कोई तर्क निष्‍कर्ष नहीं है।

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढि़ए एवम् उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों के उत्‍तर दीजिए।

निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍नों में कुछ निश्चित चिन्‍हृों #, %, @, $ और © का प्रयोग कर उत्‍तर दीजिए –

1. ‘P # Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से छोटा नहीं है।
2. ‘P © Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा और न ही बड़ा।
3. ‘P $ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो बड़ा है और न ही बराबर।
4. ‘P % Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से बड़ा नहीं है।
5. ‘P @ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा है और न ही बराबर।

आपको निम्‍नलिखित प्रत्‍येक प्रश्‍न में दिये गये कथन को सत्‍य मानना है। और पता लगाइये कि निम्‍नलिखित निष्‍कर्षो I और II में से कौनसा निश्चित रूप से सत्‍य है।

निम्‍न रिक्‍त स्‍थानों में क्रमशः कौनसे प्रतीक बायें से दायें रखे जाने चाहिए कि ‘Y > S’ तथा ‘T ≤ B’ निश्चित रूप से सत्‍य हो जाये। (बायें से दायें)
B _ T _ S _ Z _ Y

निम्‍नलिखित जानकारी को ध्‍यानपूर्वक पढि़ए एवम् उस पर आधारित निम्‍न प्रश्‍नों के उत्‍तर दीजिए।

निम्‍नलिखित प्रश्‍नों में कुछ निश्चित चिन्‍हृों #, %, @, $ और © का प्रयोग कर उत्‍तर दीजिए –

1. ‘P # Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से छोटा नहीं है।
2. ‘P © Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा और न ही बड़ा।
3. ‘P $ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो बड़ा है और न ही बराबर।
4. ‘P % Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से बड़ा नहीं है।
5. ‘P @ Q’ का अर्थ है P, Q से न तो छोटा है और न ही बराबर।

आपको निम्‍नलिखित प्रत्‍येक प्रश्‍न में दिये गये कथन को सत्‍य मानना है। और पता लगाइये कि निम्‍नलिखित निष्‍कर्षो I और II में से कौनसा निश्चित रूप से सत्‍य है।

किस अभिव्‍यक्ति में ‘R > T’ निश्चित रूप से गलत है?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
इन्‍फोसिस कम्‍पनी के मानव संसाधन से सम्‍बन्धित आँकड़ें जिसके 8 देशों में 166 कार्यालय हैं :

देश	ऑफिस	कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या	पुरुष तथा महिला कर्मचारियों का अनुपात	स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों का प्रतिशत
भारत	36	3852	7 : 5	75
यू.के.	24	3600	11 : 7	58
यू.एस.ए.	15	3465	7 : 4	60
आस्‍ट्रेलिया	16	2568	5 : 7	75
जर्मनी	21	3360	4 : 3	80
फ्रांस	17	2788	20 : 21	75
दक्षिण कोरिया	13	2054	8 : 5	50
कनाड़ा	24	3720	7 : 8	55

यदि जर्मनी में स्‍नातकोत्तर महिला कर्मचारियों की संख्‍या 1028 है तो उसी देश में पुरुष कर्मचारियों का कितना प्रतिशत स्‍नातकोत्तर है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
इन्‍फोसिस कम्‍पनी के मानव संसाधन से सम्‍बन्धित आँकड़ें जिसके 8 देशों में 166 कार्यालय हैं :

देश	ऑफिस	कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या	पुरुष तथा महिला कर्मचारियों का अनुपात	स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों का प्रतिशत
भारत	36	3852	7 : 5	75
यू.के.	24	3600	11 : 7	58
यू.एस.ए.	15	3465	7 : 4	60
आस्‍ट्रेलिया	16	2568	5 : 7	75
जर्मनी	21	3360	4 : 3	80
फ्रांस	17	2788	20 : 21	75
दक्षिण कोरिया	13	2054	8 : 5	50
कनाड़ा	24	3720	7 : 8	55

यू.के., फ्रांस तथा जर्मनी में स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या तथा भारत एवं कनाडा में पुरुष कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या के बीच अनुपात कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
इन्‍फोसिस कम्‍पनी के मानव संसाधन से सम्‍बन्धित आँकड़ें जिसके 8 देशों में 166 कार्यालय हैं :

देश	ऑफिस	कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या	पुरुष तथा महिला कर्मचारियों का अनुपात	स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों का प्रतिशत
भारत	36	3852	7 : 5	75
यू.के.	24	3600	11 : 7	58
यू.एस.ए.	15	3465	7 : 4	60
आस्‍ट्रेलिया	16	2568	5 : 7	75
जर्मनी	21	3360	4 : 3	80
फ्रांस	17	2788	20 : 21	75
दक्षिण कोरिया	13	2054	8 : 5	50
कनाड़ा	24	3720	7 : 8	55

भारत, आस्‍ट्रेलिया, दक्षिण कोरिया तथा जर्मनी से महिला कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या एवं यू.के., फ्रांस, कनाड़ा तथा यू.एस.ए. से स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या के बीच अन्‍तर कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
इन्‍फोसिस कम्‍पनी के मानव संसाधन से सम्‍बन्धित आँकड़ें जिसके 8 देशों में 166 कार्यालय हैं :

देश	ऑफिस	कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या	पुरुष तथा महिला कर्मचारियों का अनुपात	स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों का प्रतिशत
भारत	36	3852	7 : 5	75
यू.के.	24	3600	11 : 7	58
यू.एस.ए.	15	3465	7 : 4	60
आस्‍ट्रेलिया	16	2568	5 : 7	75
जर्मनी	21	3360	4 : 3	80
फ्रांस	17	2788	20 : 21	75
दक्षिण कोरिया	13	2054	8 : 5	50
कनाड़ा	24	3720	7 : 8	55

जर्मनी, फ्रांस, कनाड़ा तथा दक्षिण कोरिया से पुरुष कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या, इन्‍हीं देशों से स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या का लगभग कितना प्रतिशत है ?

निम्‍नलिखित तालिका का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
इन्‍फोसिस कम्‍पनी के मानव संसाधन से सम्‍बन्धित आँकड़ें जिसके 8 देशों में 166 कार्यालय हैं :

देश	ऑफिस	कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या	पुरुष तथा महिला कर्मचारियों का अनुपात	स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों का प्रतिशत
भारत	36	3852	7 : 5	75
यू.के.	24	3600	11 : 7	58
यू.एस.ए.	15	3465	7 : 4	60
आस्‍ट्रेलिया	16	2568	5 : 7	75
जर्मनी	21	3360	4 : 3	80
फ्रांस	17	2788	20 : 21	75
दक्षिण कोरिया	13	2054	8 : 5	50
कनाड़ा	24	3720	7 : 8	55

भारत, यू.के., यू.एस.ए. तथा आस्‍ट्रेलिया से स्‍नातकोत्तर कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या, आस्‍ट्रेलिया, कनाडा, दक्षिण कोरिया तथा यू.एस.ए. से महिला कर्मचारियों की कुल संख्‍या से कितना प्रतिशत अधिक है ?

निम्‍नलिखित बार – ग्राफ का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
वर्ष 2018 में सात कम्‍पनियों के आय तथा व्‍यय :


कम्‍पनी D तथा E को एक साथ मिलाकर प्राप्‍त होने वाला लाभ/हानि प्रतिशत लगभग कितना है ?

निम्‍नलिखित बार – ग्राफ का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
वर्ष 2018 में सात कम्‍पनियों के आय तथा व्‍यय :


वर्ष 2015 से 2018 में यदि कम्‍पनी B की आय में 10% की वृद्धि हुई हो तथा वर्ष 2015 में कम्‍पनी ने 20% का लाभ अर्जित किया हो तो वर्ष 2015 में कम्‍पनी B का व्‍यय कितना था ? (मान करोड़ में दशमलव के दो अंकों तक)

निम्‍नलिखित बार – ग्राफ का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
वर्ष 2018 में सात कम्‍पनियों के आय तथा व्‍यय :


यदि वर्ष 2018 में कम्‍पनी F का व्‍यय, वर्ष 2015 में अपने व्‍यय से 20% अधिक था तथा वर्ष 2015 में कम्‍पनी ने 10% का लाभ अर्जित किया हो तो वर्ष 2015 में कम्‍पनी F की आय रु. करोड़ में कितनी थी (मान दशमलव के दो अंकों तक) ?

निम्‍नलिखित बार – ग्राफ का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
वर्ष 2018 में सात कम्‍पनियों के आय तथा व्‍यय :


निम्‍नलिखित कम्‍पनियों में किसे वर्ष 2018 में होने वाला लाभ/हानि प्रतिशत सर्वाधिक था ?

निम्‍नलिखित बार – ग्राफ का ध्‍यानपूर्वक अध्‍ययन करें तथा दिए गए प्रश्‍न का उत्तर दें।
वर्ष 2018 में सात कम्‍पनियों के आय तथा व्‍यय :


वर्ष 2018 में सभी कम्‍पनियों को मिलाकर उनके द्वारा अर्जित लाभ का प्रतिशत लगभग कितना है ?

Read the following passage carefully and certain words in the passage are printed in bold letters to help you locate them easily while answering some of these questions.
As Donald Trump is sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, India must prepare for the extraordinary turbulence in America’s internal and external orientation. Although the new president is well disposed towards India, his efforts to change America’s trajectory will have huge economic and political consequences for India. Delhi must be nimble enough to cope with the challenges and take advantage of the new possibilities generated by Trump over the next four years. Nearly two decades of steady improvement in bilateral relations across different administrations in Washington and Delhi has indeed made the relationship less vulnerable to wild oscillations. In Washington, Delhi has accumulated an abundance of bipartisan goodwill. In Delhi, building on the efforts of his three recent predecessors P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made bold to declare that India has overcome its past hesitations in engaging America. On its part, Washington has learnt to curb the recurring itch to mediate in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The nuclear dispute that once roiled relations is now behind us. There is a solid business relationship with annual trade at more than 100 billion dollars and a deepening cooperation on bilateral, regional and global issues. The Indian Diaspora has steadily grown in its influence in American domestic politics it has sent five men and women to the House of Representatives in the 2018 elections. California has also elected Kamala Harris to become the first ever Indian-American senator. This contingent of six from the Indian Diaspora is the largest ever to be elected to the US Congress.
Under Modi, India has celebrated the achievements of the Diaspora in America and values its role as a bridge between the two nations. This good news for India is complicated by the fact that the United States has entered an unpredictable phase under Trump. Many propositions that India has taken for granted about the United States open borders, leadership of the liberal global economic order and military dominance over the Eurasian landmass since the middle of the 20th century are being challenged by Trump. Trump has won by promising to curb immigration into the United States by building a wall on the border with Mexico and throwing out those staying on illegally. He has threatened to impose “extreme vetting” on visitors from the Muslim world. He argues that American workers are victims of economic globalisation. He believe the US taxpayers pay too high a price for American military alliances abroad. He has dismissed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the powerful seven-decade-old Euro-Atlantic alliance, as “obsolete”. Trump demands that US allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea take a larger share of the defence burden. Trump’s refusal to moderate either the tone or substance of his controversial positions since the election suggests that it will not be business as usual in America for the next four years. To be sure, Trump’s policies will be severely contested in Washington in the US Congress by the opposition Democrats as well as leading lights of his own Republican Party. The mainstream policy and media establishments are already at war with Trump. Even limited successes for Trump, however, would mean that Delhi will be dealing with a very different United States than it has known since Independence. For one, Delhi will have to quickly come to terms with the historic shift in America’s approach to economic globalisation under Trump. For nearly three decades, Delhi has defined its approach to globalisation in terms of resisting American pressures for liberalisation and standing up to the US in multilateral economic forums. It has repeatedly cried wolf about America’s protectionism. Delhi might now have the opportunity to see what even a moderately protectionist America might really look like. Insourcing of skilled Indian labour through the H1B visa system and outsourcing of work to Bangalore are bound to get harder under Trump. Delhi’s somewhat perverse cheer at Trump slaying the Trans Pacific Partnership might be short-lived as many trade partners of the United States embark, kicking and screaming, upon negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Delhi needs to end its defensive crouch on external economic engagement and re-position itself to cope with the structural changes that Trump threatens to engineer in the global economic order. As in the economic, so in the political domain, Delhi will have to stop being defensive.
Even as Delhi sought a strategic partnership with America over the last two decades, it invested in insuring against American power in the unipolar world by working with Russia and China for a “multipolar” world. That strategy, arguably, has only helped lend legitimacy to China’s new global role and Russian bargaining power with the West, while slowing down the pace of constructing India’s partnership with the US. As Moscow pursues a reset with Trump’s Washington, China will seek to postpone, if not limit the potential confrontation with America. Like Moscow and Beijing, Delhi must focus more on securing the national interest in a fluid moment in great power relations. It can’t afford to remain a prisoner of slogans like multi-polarity. Russia and China will abandon that slogan the minute they have sustainable deals with Trump. The Indian strategic community often complains about America’s “transactional” approach. Delhi must expect Trump, who published the book The Art of the Deal in 1987, to be the epitome of this approach. While he threatens a trade war and dumps the “One China” policy, Trump has signaled the intent to renegotiate the terms of endearment with Beijing. To succeed in Trump’s world, Prime Minister Modi will need all his skills at identifying India’s potential deals with America and closing the transactions after intensive bargaining.

On the basis of your reading, choose an appropriate title for the passage.

Read the following passage carefully and certain words in the passage are printed in bold letters to help you locate them easily while answering some of these questions.
As Donald Trump is sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, India must prepare for the extraordinary turbulence in America’s internal and external orientation. Although the new president is well disposed towards India, his efforts to change America’s trajectory will have huge economic and political consequences for India. Delhi must be nimble enough to cope with the challenges and take advantage of the new possibilities generated by Trump over the next four years. Nearly two decades of steady improvement in bilateral relations across different administrations in Washington and Delhi has indeed made the relationship less vulnerable to wild oscillations. In Washington, Delhi has accumulated an abundance of bipartisan goodwill. In Delhi, building on the efforts of his three recent predecessors P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made bold to declare that India has overcome its past hesitations in engaging America. On its part, Washington has learnt to curb the recurring itch to mediate in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The nuclear dispute that once roiled relations is now behind us. There is a solid business relationship with annual trade at more than 100 billion dollars and a deepening cooperation on bilateral, regional and global issues. The Indian Diaspora has steadily grown in its influence in American domestic politics it has sent five men and women to the House of Representatives in the 2018 elections. California has also elected Kamala Harris to become the first ever Indian-American senator. This contingent of six from the Indian Diaspora is the largest ever to be elected to the US Congress.
Under Modi, India has celebrated the achievements of the Diaspora in America and values its role as a bridge between the two nations. This good news for India is complicated by the fact that the United States has entered an unpredictable phase under Trump. Many propositions that India has taken for granted about the United States open borders, leadership of the liberal global economic order and military dominance over the Eurasian landmass since the middle of the 20th century are being challenged by Trump. Trump has won by promising to curb immigration into the United States by building a wall on the border with Mexico and throwing out those staying on illegally. He has threatened to impose “extreme vetting” on visitors from the Muslim world. He argues that American workers are victims of economic globalisation. He believe the US taxpayers pay too high a price for American military alliances abroad. He has dismissed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the powerful seven-decade-old Euro-Atlantic alliance, as “obsolete”. Trump demands that US allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea take a larger share of the defence burden. Trump’s refusal to moderate either the tone or substance of his controversial positions since the election suggests that it will not be business as usual in America for the next four years. To be sure, Trump’s policies will be severely contested in Washington in the US Congress by the opposition Democrats as well as leading lights of his own Republican Party. The mainstream policy and media establishments are already at war with Trump. Even limited successes for Trump, however, would mean that Delhi will be dealing with a very different United States than it has known since Independence. For one, Delhi will have to quickly come to terms with the historic shift in America’s approach to economic globalisation under Trump. For nearly three decades, Delhi has defined its approach to globalisation in terms of resisting American pressures for liberalisation and standing up to the US in multilateral economic forums. It has repeatedly cried wolf about America’s protectionism. Delhi might now have the opportunity to see what even a moderately protectionist America might really look like. Insourcing of skilled Indian labour through the H1B visa system and outsourcing of work to Bangalore are bound to get harder under Trump. Delhi’s somewhat perverse cheer at Trump slaying the Trans Pacific Partnership might be short-lived as many trade partners of the United States embark, kicking and screaming, upon negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Delhi needs to end its defensive crouch on external economic engagement and re-position itself to cope with the structural changes that Trump threatens to engineer in the global economic order. As in the economic, so in the political domain, Delhi will have to stop being defensive.
Even as Delhi sought a strategic partnership with America over the last two decades, it invested in insuring against American power in the unipolar world by working with Russia and China for a “multipolar” world. That strategy, arguably, has only helped lend legitimacy to China’s new global role and Russian bargaining power with the West, while slowing down the pace of constructing India’s partnership with the US. As Moscow pursues a reset with Trump’s Washington, China will seek to postpone, if not limit the potential confrontation with America. Like Moscow and Beijing, Delhi must focus more on securing the national interest in a fluid moment in great power relations. It can’t afford to remain a prisoner of slogans like multi-polarity. Russia and China will abandon that slogan the minute they have sustainable deals with Trump. The Indian strategic community often complains about America’s “transactional” approach. Delhi must expect Trump, who published the book The Art of the Deal in 1987, to be the epitome of this approach. While he threatens a trade war and dumps the “One China” policy, Trump has signaled the intent to renegotiate the terms of endearment with Beijing. To succeed in Trump’s world, Prime Minister Modi will need all his skills at identifying India’s potential deals with America and closing the transactions after intensive bargaining.

According to the passage what beliefs does the new US president hold?

Read the following passage carefully and certain words in the passage are printed in bold letters to help you locate them easily while answering some of these questions.
As Donald Trump is sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, India must prepare for the extraordinary turbulence in America’s internal and external orientation. Although the new president is well disposed towards India, his efforts to change America’s trajectory will have huge economic and political consequences for India. Delhi must be nimble enough to cope with the challenges and take advantage of the new possibilities generated by Trump over the next four years. Nearly two decades of steady improvement in bilateral relations across different administrations in Washington and Delhi has indeed made the relationship less vulnerable to wild oscillations. In Washington, Delhi has accumulated an abundance of bipartisan goodwill. In Delhi, building on the efforts of his three recent predecessors P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made bold to declare that India has overcome its past hesitations in engaging America. On its part, Washington has learnt to curb the recurring itch to mediate in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The nuclear dispute that once roiled relations is now behind us. There is a solid business relationship with annual trade at more than 100 billion dollars and a deepening cooperation on bilateral, regional and global issues. The Indian Diaspora has steadily grown in its influence in American domestic politics it has sent five men and women to the House of Representatives in the 2018 elections. California has also elected Kamala Harris to become the first ever Indian-American senator. This contingent of six from the Indian Diaspora is the largest ever to be elected to the US Congress.
Under Modi, India has celebrated the achievements of the Diaspora in America and values its role as a bridge between the two nations. This good news for India is complicated by the fact that the United States has entered an unpredictable phase under Trump. Many propositions that India has taken for granted about the United States open borders, leadership of the liberal global economic order and military dominance over the Eurasian landmass since the middle of the 20th century are being challenged by Trump. Trump has won by promising to curb immigration into the United States by building a wall on the border with Mexico and throwing out those staying on illegally. He has threatened to impose “extreme vetting” on visitors from the Muslim world. He argues that American workers are victims of economic globalisation. He believe the US taxpayers pay too high a price for American military alliances abroad. He has dismissed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the powerful seven-decade-old Euro-Atlantic alliance, as “obsolete”. Trump demands that US allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea take a larger share of the defence burden. Trump’s refusal to moderate either the tone or substance of his controversial positions since the election suggests that it will not be business as usual in America for the next four years. To be sure, Trump’s policies will be severely contested in Washington in the US Congress by the opposition Democrats as well as leading lights of his own Republican Party. The mainstream policy and media establishments are already at war with Trump. Even limited successes for Trump, however, would mean that Delhi will be dealing with a very different United States than it has known since Independence. For one, Delhi will have to quickly come to terms with the historic shift in America’s approach to economic globalisation under Trump. For nearly three decades, Delhi has defined its approach to globalisation in terms of resisting American pressures for liberalisation and standing up to the US in multilateral economic forums. It has repeatedly cried wolf about America’s protectionism. Delhi might now have the opportunity to see what even a moderately protectionist America might really look like. Insourcing of skilled Indian labour through the H1B visa system and outsourcing of work to Bangalore are bound to get harder under Trump. Delhi’s somewhat perverse cheer at Trump slaying the Trans Pacific Partnership might be short-lived as many trade partners of the United States embark, kicking and screaming, upon negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Delhi needs to end its defensive crouch on external economic engagement and re-position itself to cope with the structural changes that Trump threatens to engineer in the global economic order. As in the economic, so in the political domain, Delhi will have to stop being defensive.
Even as Delhi sought a strategic partnership with America over the last two decades, it invested in insuring against American power in the unipolar world by working with Russia and China for a “multipolar” world. That strategy, arguably, has only helped lend legitimacy to China’s new global role and Russian bargaining power with the West, while slowing down the pace of constructing India’s partnership with the US. As Moscow pursues a reset with Trump’s Washington, China will seek to postpone, if not limit the potential confrontation with America. Like Moscow and Beijing, Delhi must focus more on securing the national interest in a fluid moment in great power relations. It can’t afford to remain a prisoner of slogans like multi-polarity. Russia and China will abandon that slogan the minute they have sustainable deals with Trump. The Indian strategic community often complains about America’s “transactional” approach. Delhi must expect Trump, who published the book The Art of the Deal in 1987, to be the epitome of this approach. While he threatens a trade war and dumps the “One China” policy, Trump has signaled the intent to renegotiate the terms of endearment with Beijing. To succeed in Trump’s world, Prime Minister Modi will need all his skills at identifying India’s potential deals with America and closing the transactions after intensive bargaining.

Why does the author say that “India can’t afford to remain a prisoner of slogans like multi-polarity”?

Read the following passage carefully and certain words in the passage are printed in bold letters to help you locate them easily while answering some of these questions.
As Donald Trump is sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, India must prepare for the extraordinary turbulence in America’s internal and external orientation. Although the new president is well disposed towards India, his efforts to change America’s trajectory will have huge economic and political consequences for India. Delhi must be nimble enough to cope with the challenges and take advantage of the new possibilities generated by Trump over the next four years. Nearly two decades of steady improvement in bilateral relations across different administrations in Washington and Delhi has indeed made the relationship less vulnerable to wild oscillations. In Washington, Delhi has accumulated an abundance of bipartisan goodwill. In Delhi, building on the efforts of his three recent predecessors P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made bold to declare that India has overcome its past hesitations in engaging America. On its part, Washington has learnt to curb the recurring itch to mediate in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The nuclear dispute that once roiled relations is now behind us. There is a solid business relationship with annual trade at more than 100 billion dollars and a deepening cooperation on bilateral, regional and global issues. The Indian Diaspora has steadily grown in its influence in American domestic politics it has sent five men and women to the House of Representatives in the 2018 elections. California has also elected Kamala Harris to become the first ever Indian-American senator. This contingent of six from the Indian Diaspora is the largest ever to be elected to the US Congress.
Under Modi, India has celebrated the achievements of the Diaspora in America and values its role as a bridge between the two nations. This good news for India is complicated by the fact that the United States has entered an unpredictable phase under Trump. Many propositions that India has taken for granted about the United States open borders, leadership of the liberal global economic order and military dominance over the Eurasian landmass since the middle of the 20th century are being challenged by Trump. Trump has won by promising to curb immigration into the United States by building a wall on the border with Mexico and throwing out those staying on illegally. He has threatened to impose “extreme vetting” on visitors from the Muslim world. He argues that American workers are victims of economic globalisation. He believe the US taxpayers pay too high a price for American military alliances abroad. He has dismissed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the powerful seven-decade-old Euro-Atlantic alliance, as “obsolete”. Trump demands that US allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea take a larger share of the defence burden. Trump’s refusal to moderate either the tone or substance of his controversial positions since the election suggests that it will not be business as usual in America for the next four years. To be sure, Trump’s policies will be severely contested in Washington in the US Congress by the opposition Democrats as well as leading lights of his own Republican Party. The mainstream policy and media establishments are already at war with Trump. Even limited successes for Trump, however, would mean that Delhi will be dealing with a very different United States than it has known since Independence. For one, Delhi will have to quickly come to terms with the historic shift in America’s approach to economic globalisation under Trump. For nearly three decades, Delhi has defined its approach to globalisation in terms of resisting American pressures for liberalisation and standing up to the US in multilateral economic forums. It has repeatedly cried wolf about America’s protectionism. Delhi might now have the opportunity to see what even a moderately protectionist America might really look like. Insourcing of skilled Indian labour through the H1B visa system and outsourcing of work to Bangalore are bound to get harder under Trump. Delhi’s somewhat perverse cheer at Trump slaying the Trans Pacific Partnership might be short-lived as many trade partners of the United States embark, kicking and screaming, upon negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Delhi needs to end its defensive crouch on external economic engagement and re-position itself to cope with the structural changes that Trump threatens to engineer in the global economic order. As in the economic, so in the political domain, Delhi will have to stop being defensive.
Even as Delhi sought a strategic partnership with America over the last two decades, it invested in insuring against American power in the unipolar world by working with Russia and China for a “multipolar” world. That strategy, arguably, has only helped lend legitimacy to China’s new global role and Russian bargaining power with the West, while slowing down the pace of constructing India’s partnership with the US. As Moscow pursues a reset with Trump’s Washington, China will seek to postpone, if not limit the potential confrontation with America. Like Moscow and Beijing, Delhi must focus more on securing the national interest in a fluid moment in great power relations. It can’t afford to remain a prisoner of slogans like multi-polarity. Russia and China will abandon that slogan the minute they have sustainable deals with Trump. The Indian strategic community often complains about America’s “transactional” approach. Delhi must expect Trump, who published the book The Art of the Deal in 1987, to be the epitome of this approach. While he threatens a trade war and dumps the “One China” policy, Trump has signaled the intent to renegotiate the terms of endearment with Beijing. To succeed in Trump’s world, Prime Minister Modi will need all his skills at identifying India’s potential deals with America and closing the transactions after intensive bargaining.

Which book was published by Donald Trump?

Read the following passage carefully and certain words in the passage are printed in bold letters to help you locate them easily while answering some of these questions.
As Donald Trump is sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, India must prepare for the extraordinary turbulence in America’s internal and external orientation. Although the new president is well disposed towards India, his efforts to change America’s trajectory will have huge economic and political consequences for India. Delhi must be nimble enough to cope with the challenges and take advantage of the new possibilities generated by Trump over the next four years. Nearly two decades of steady improvement in bilateral relations across different administrations in Washington and Delhi has indeed made the relationship less vulnerable to wild oscillations. In Washington, Delhi has accumulated an abundance of bipartisan goodwill. In Delhi, building on the efforts of his three recent predecessors P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made bold to declare that India has overcome its past hesitations in engaging America. On its part, Washington has learnt to curb the recurring itch to mediate in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The nuclear dispute that once roiled relations is now behind us. There is a solid business relationship with annual trade at more than 100 billion dollars and a deepening cooperation on bilateral, regional and global issues. The Indian Diaspora has steadily grown in its influence in American domestic politics it has sent five men and women to the House of Representatives in the 2018 elections. California has also elected Kamala Harris to become the first ever Indian-American senator. This contingent of six from the Indian Diaspora is the largest ever to be elected to the US Congress.
Under Modi, India has celebrated the achievements of the Diaspora in America and values its role as a bridge between the two nations. This good news for India is complicated by the fact that the United States has entered an unpredictable phase under Trump. Many propositions that India has taken for granted about the United States open borders, leadership of the liberal global economic order and military dominance over the Eurasian landmass since the middle of the 20th century are being challenged by Trump. Trump has won by promising to curb immigration into the United States by building a wall on the border with Mexico and throwing out those staying on illegally. He has threatened to impose “extreme vetting” on visitors from the Muslim world. He argues that American workers are victims of economic globalisation. He believe the US taxpayers pay too high a price for American military alliances abroad. He has dismissed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the powerful seven-decade-old Euro-Atlantic alliance, as “obsolete”. Trump demands that US allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea take a larger share of the defence burden. Trump’s refusal to moderate either the tone or substance of his controversial positions since the election suggests that it will not be business as usual in America for the next four years. To be sure, Trump’s policies will be severely contested in Washington in the US Congress by the opposition Democrats as well as leading lights of his own Republican Party. The mainstream policy and media establishments are already at war with Trump. Even limited successes for Trump, however, would mean that Delhi will be dealing with a very different United States than it has known since Independence. For one, Delhi will have to quickly come to terms with the historic shift in America’s approach to economic globalisation under Trump. For nearly three decades, Delhi has defined its approach to globalisation in terms of resisting American pressures for liberalisation and standing up to the US in multilateral economic forums. It has repeatedly cried wolf about America’s protectionism. Delhi might now have the opportunity to see what even a moderately protectionist America might really look like. Insourcing of skilled Indian labour through the H1B visa system and outsourcing of work to Bangalore are bound to get harder under Trump. Delhi’s somewhat perverse cheer at Trump slaying the Trans Pacific Partnership might be short-lived as many trade partners of the United States embark, kicking and screaming, upon negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Delhi needs to end its defensive crouch on external economic engagement and re-position itself to cope with the structural changes that Trump threatens to engineer in the global economic order. As in the economic, so in the political domain, Delhi will have to stop being defensive.
Even as Delhi sought a strategic partnership with America over the last two decades, it invested in insuring against American power in the unipolar world by working with Russia and China for a “multipolar” world. That strategy, arguably, has only helped lend legitimacy to China’s new global role and Russian bargaining power with the West, while slowing down the pace of constructing India’s partnership with the US. As Moscow pursues a reset with Trump’s Washington, China will seek to postpone, if not limit the potential confrontation with America. Like Moscow and Beijing, Delhi must focus more on securing the national interest in a fluid moment in great power relations. It can’t afford to remain a prisoner of slogans like multi-polarity. Russia and China will abandon that slogan the minute they have sustainable deals with Trump. The Indian strategic community often complains about America’s “transactional” approach. Delhi must expect Trump, who published the book The Art of the Deal in 1987, to be the epitome of this approach. While he threatens a trade war and dumps the “One China” policy, Trump has signaled the intent to renegotiate the terms of endearment with Beijing. To succeed in Trump’s world, Prime Minister Modi will need all his skills at identifying India’s potential deals with America and closing the transactions after intensive bargaining.

Why does the US Congress oppose President Mr. Trump’s beliefs?

Read the following passage carefully and certain words in the passage are printed in bold letters to help you locate them easily while answering some of these questions.
As Donald Trump is sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, India must prepare for the extraordinary turbulence in America’s internal and external orientation. Although the new president is well disposed towards India, his efforts to change America’s trajectory will have huge economic and political consequences for India. Delhi must be nimble enough to cope with the challenges and take advantage of the new possibilities generated by Trump over the next four years. Nearly two decades of steady improvement in bilateral relations across different administrations in Washington and Delhi has indeed made the relationship less vulnerable to wild oscillations. In Washington, Delhi has accumulated an abundance of bipartisan goodwill. In Delhi, building on the efforts of his three recent predecessors P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made bold to declare that India has overcome its past hesitations in engaging America. On its part, Washington has learnt to curb the recurring itch to mediate in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The nuclear dispute that once roiled relations is now behind us. There is a solid business relationship with annual trade at more than 100 billion dollars and a deepening cooperation on bilateral, regional and global issues. The Indian Diaspora has steadily grown in its influence in American domestic politics it has sent five men and women to the House of Representatives in the 2018 elections. California has also elected Kamala Harris to become the first ever Indian-American senator. This contingent of six from the Indian Diaspora is the largest ever to be elected to the US Congress.
Under Modi, India has celebrated the achievements of the Diaspora in America and values its role as a bridge between the two nations. This good news for India is complicated by the fact that the United States has entered an unpredictable phase under Trump. Many propositions that India has taken for granted about the United States open borders, leadership of the liberal global economic order and military dominance over the Eurasian landmass since the middle of the 20th century are being challenged by Trump. Trump has won by promising to curb immigration into the United States by building a wall on the border with Mexico and throwing out those staying on illegally. He has threatened to impose “extreme vetting” on visitors from the Muslim world. He argues that American workers are victims of economic globalisation. He believe the US taxpayers pay too high a price for American military alliances abroad. He has dismissed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the powerful seven-decade-old Euro-Atlantic alliance, as “obsolete”. Trump demands that US allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea take a larger share of the defence burden. Trump’s refusal to moderate either the tone or substance of his controversial positions since the election suggests that it will not be business as usual in America for the next four years. To be sure, Trump’s policies will be severely contested in Washington in the US Congress by the opposition Democrats as well as leading lights of his own Republican Party. The mainstream policy and media establishments are already at war with Trump. Even limited successes for Trump, however, would mean that Delhi will be dealing with a very different United States than it has known since Independence. For one, Delhi will have to quickly come to terms with the historic shift in America’s approach to economic globalisation under Trump. For nearly three decades, Delhi has defined its approach to globalisation in terms of resisting American pressures for liberalisation and standing up to the US in multilateral economic forums. It has repeatedly cried wolf about America’s protectionism. Delhi might now have the opportunity to see what even a moderately protectionist America might really look like. Insourcing of skilled Indian labour through the H1B visa system and outsourcing of work to Bangalore are bound to get harder under Trump. Delhi’s somewhat perverse cheer at Trump slaying the Trans Pacific Partnership might be short-lived as many trade partners of the United States embark, kicking and screaming, upon negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Delhi needs to end its defensive crouch on external economic engagement and re-position itself to cope with the structural changes that Trump threatens to engineer in the global economic order. As in the economic, so in the political domain, Delhi will have to stop being defensive.
Even as Delhi sought a strategic partnership with America over the last two decades, it invested in insuring against American power in the unipolar world by working with Russia and China for a “multipolar” world. That strategy, arguably, has only helped lend legitimacy to China’s new global role and Russian bargaining power with the West, while slowing down the pace of constructing India’s partnership with the US. As Moscow pursues a reset with Trump’s Washington, China will seek to postpone, if not limit the potential confrontation with America. Like Moscow and Beijing, Delhi must focus more on securing the national interest in a fluid moment in great power relations. It can’t afford to remain a prisoner of slogans like multi-polarity. Russia and China will abandon that slogan the minute they have sustainable deals with Trump. The Indian strategic community often complains about America’s “transactional” approach. Delhi must expect Trump, who published the book The Art of the Deal in 1987, to be the epitome of this approach. While he threatens a trade war and dumps the “One China” policy, Trump has signaled the intent to renegotiate the terms of endearment with Beijing. To succeed in Trump’s world, Prime Minister Modi will need all his skills at identifying India’s potential deals with America and closing the transactions after intensive bargaining.

Choose the word which is similar to the word ‘Confrontation’ as used in the passage.

Read the following passage carefully and certain words in the passage are printed in bold letters to help you locate them easily while answering some of these questions.
As Donald Trump is sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, India must prepare for the extraordinary turbulence in America’s internal and external orientation. Although the new president is well disposed towards India, his efforts to change America’s trajectory will have huge economic and political consequences for India. Delhi must be nimble enough to cope with the challenges and take advantage of the new possibilities generated by Trump over the next four years. Nearly two decades of steady improvement in bilateral relations across different administrations in Washington and Delhi has indeed made the relationship less vulnerable to wild oscillations. In Washington, Delhi has accumulated an abundance of bipartisan goodwill. In Delhi, building on the efforts of his three recent predecessors P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made bold to declare that India has overcome its past hesitations in engaging America. On its part, Washington has learnt to curb the recurring itch to mediate in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The nuclear dispute that once roiled relations is now behind us. There is a solid business relationship with annual trade at more than 100 billion dollars and a deepening cooperation on bilateral, regional and global issues. The Indian Diaspora has steadily grown in its influence in American domestic politics it has sent five men and women to the House of Representatives in the 2018 elections. California has also elected Kamala Harris to become the first ever Indian-American senator. This contingent of six from the Indian Diaspora is the largest ever to be elected to the US Congress.
Under Modi, India has celebrated the achievements of the Diaspora in America and values its role as a bridge between the two nations. This good news for India is complicated by the fact that the United States has entered an unpredictable phase under Trump. Many propositions that India has taken for granted about the United States open borders, leadership of the liberal global economic order and military dominance over the Eurasian landmass since the middle of the 20th century are being challenged by Trump. Trump has won by promising to curb immigration into the United States by building a wall on the border with Mexico and throwing out those staying on illegally. He has threatened to impose “extreme vetting” on visitors from the Muslim world. He argues that American workers are victims of economic globalisation. He believe the US taxpayers pay too high a price for American military alliances abroad. He has dismissed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the powerful seven-decade-old Euro-Atlantic alliance, as “obsolete”. Trump demands that US allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea take a larger share of the defence burden. Trump’s refusal to moderate either the tone or substance of his controversial positions since the election suggests that it will not be business as usual in America for the next four years. To be sure, Trump’s policies will be severely contested in Washington in the US Congress by the opposition Democrats as well as leading lights of his own Republican Party. The mainstream policy and media establishments are already at war with Trump. Even limited successes for Trump, however, would mean that Delhi will be dealing with a very different United States than it has known since Independence. For one, Delhi will have to quickly come to terms with the historic shift in America’s approach to economic globalisation under Trump. For nearly three decades, Delhi has defined its approach to globalisation in terms of resisting American pressures for liberalisation and standing up to the US in multilateral economic forums. It has repeatedly cried wolf about America’s protectionism. Delhi might now have the opportunity to see what even a moderately protectionist America might really look like. Insourcing of skilled Indian labour through the H1B visa system and outsourcing of work to Bangalore are bound to get harder under Trump. Delhi’s somewhat perverse cheer at Trump slaying the Trans Pacific Partnership might be short-lived as many trade partners of the United States embark, kicking and screaming, upon negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Delhi needs to end its defensive crouch on external economic engagement and re-position itself to cope with the structural changes that Trump threatens to engineer in the global economic order. As in the economic, so in the political domain, Delhi will have to stop being defensive.
Even as Delhi sought a strategic partnership with America over the last two decades, it invested in insuring against American power in the unipolar world by working with Russia and China for a “multipolar” world. That strategy, arguably, has only helped lend legitimacy to China’s new global role and Russian bargaining power with the West, while slowing down the pace of constructing India’s partnership with the US. As Moscow pursues a reset with Trump’s Washington, China will seek to postpone, if not limit the potential confrontation with America. Like Moscow and Beijing, Delhi must focus more on securing the national interest in a fluid moment in great power relations. It can’t afford to remain a prisoner of slogans like multi-polarity. Russia and China will abandon that slogan the minute they have sustainable deals with Trump. The Indian strategic community often complains about America’s “transactional” approach. Delhi must expect Trump, who published the book The Art of the Deal in 1987, to be the epitome of this approach. While he threatens a trade war and dumps the “One China” policy, Trump has signaled the intent to renegotiate the terms of endearment with Beijing. To succeed in Trump’s world, Prime Minister Modi will need all his skills at identifying India’s potential deals with America and closing the transactions after intensive bargaining.

Choose the word which is similar to the word ‘Epitome’ as used in the passage.

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in bold to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions.

The Uri attacks have returned India-Pakistan relations to an old and familiar groove. India blames Pakistani terrorists. Pakistan denies the charge, instead proposing that India’s oppression in Kashmir fuelled the attack on the army camp. This clash of narratives is unlikely to end. But as India contemplates its response, it may be worthwhile to look at how the world of scholars is analysing the relationship between the Pakistani state and its non-state armed groups.

For a long time, it has been observed that many states defy Max Weber’s theory that modern states seek a monopoly over the means of coercion and do not allow non-state groups to use violence. We know that states often don’t crush armed organisations, even if they can; or they liquidate some groups while protecting others. In light of this larger problem, the key puzzle about Pakistan is: Should Pakistan’s relationship with non-state terror groups be viewed as simply an illustration of a larger problem that many states encounter, or is Pakistan sui generis with few relevant comparisons?

In a body of emerging work, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) argues that Pakistan is not the only country to have collaborated with non-state armed groups. The Indian state of Chhattisgarh protected and deployed a para-military group (SalwaJudum) against its Maoist insurgents, and Delhi collaborated with non-state groups to deal with the insurgents in the Northeast too. Similar examples can be cited from Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma’s Shan state etc. Yelena Biberman (Skidmore College), another scholar working on the outsourcing of security to non-state groups, argues roughly in the same vein, drawing comparisons between how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish rebels and how India used Ikhwan-ulMuslimoon in its counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Indeed, the problem is not only about collaboration. As we know, over the last few years, Pakistan has launched a brutal military assault against those terrorist groups that attack the Pakistani state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, but it has protected terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, or groups like the Afghan Taliban that violently seek to undermine the elected governments of Afghanistan. Staniland explores why this is so. The divergence is driven by two sets of factors: The ideological correspondence between the state and the armed group, and the operational utility of the armed organisation. By this logic, Pakistan would consistently support LeT and the Afghan Taliban because both of these organisations share the state’s ideology and are operationally strong, but its support for Jaish-e-Mohammed would be inconsistent, because the latter organisation also attacks Pakistani groups that have nothing to do with India, and the Pakistani army would wish to decimate the Pakistani Taliban because their target is the Pakistani state itself. Commitment to Islam is not the sole issue. Such a commitment must also be conjoined to a strong opposition to India and to the project of dominating Afghanistan.

This comparative argument about Pakistan is pitted against those who contend that Pakistan’s relationship with non-state actors is virtually unparalleled. In Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Christine Fair (Georgetown University) argues that Pakistan is ideology-driven, not security-driven. A standard security calculus, emphasising the primacy of national interest and a calibration of costs and benefits, would have demonstrated the necessity of compromise with India. But Fair writes: “For Pakistan’s men on horseback, not winning, even repeatedly, is not the same thing as losing. Simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition, defeat.”

Pakistan’s army sees victory, says Fair, simply “as the ability to continue fighting”, regardless of consequences for the nation’s development, welfare or international opinion. It is hard to find such states in history. Fair’s explanation of how Pakistan’s army distinguishes between good and bad terrorists is also different from Staniland’s. The bad ones are not only those who have turned against the Pakistani state and army, especially the Pakistani Taliban (as distinct from the Afghan Taliban), but also those who are inspired by the Deobandi religious tradition. The good terrorists, in contrast, are not only those opposed to India, but also ones inspired by the Al-Hadith tradition, which seeks Muslim unity and is not out to attack minority Muslim sects such as the Shias, or syncretistic Islamic groups such as the Sufis. Deobandiorganisations violently attack the latter groups as heretics or apostates, but Al-Hadith organisations, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, do not.

Whichever argument is correct, the implications are serious. The first implication is for the liberal approaches to understanding Pakistan.

Liberals have resolutely believed that enhancing people-to-people exchanges, experiencing cultural similarities and expanding trade with Pakistan would build the foundations of peace. It is not that such exchanges should be abandoned, but one should clearly see their limits. An argument about the re-discovery of a shared culture runs up against the very foundations of the Pakistani state.

In a famous exchange in the 1940s, Maulana Azad had argued that Pakistan was unnecessary because Muslims and Hindus, though religiously distinct, had the same Indian culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s argument was the opposite. Not only were Hindus and Muslims culturally distinct, but the preservation of Muslim culture, Jinnah said, required a separate state. It is Jinnah’s argument that became the basis for Pakistan. One can see why a discourse about cultural similarities can only threaten the state in Pakistan and its army will never allow it to become the dominant discourse. Maulana Azad can’t possibly become a Pakistani hero.

When anti-Indianism is constitutive, it can’t easily be expelled. That being so, should one believe that Pakistan’s army would give up its relationship with non-state terror groups that call India their incorrigible enemy? That can happen if such groups, to use Staniland’s argument, lose their operational utility. The strategic community in India may have to think seriously about how to make that happen. It would also help if Delhi repairs its relationship with Kashmir. Nothing lends greater strength to Pakistan’s army and terrorist organisations than unrest in Kashmir. Nothing lends greater unity to Pakistan’s deeply fractured polity and society than protests in Kashmir — not even Islam. Expected to be its cultural glue, Islam has actually been Pakistan’s source of interminable religious conflict.

What is the reason behind blaming of Pakistan by India?

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in bold to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions.

The Uri attacks have returned India-Pakistan relations to an old and familiar groove. India blames Pakistani terrorists. Pakistan denies the charge, instead proposing that India’s oppression in Kashmir fuelled the attack on the army camp. This clash of narratives is unlikely to end. But as India contemplates its response, it may be worthwhile to look at how the world of scholars is analysing the relationship between the Pakistani state and its non-state armed groups.

For a long time, it has been observed that many states defy Max Weber’s theory that modern states seek a monopoly over the means of coercion and do not allow non-state groups to use violence. We know that states often don’t crush armed organisations, even if they can; or they liquidate some groups while protecting others. In light of this larger problem, the key puzzle about Pakistan is: Should Pakistan’s relationship with non-state terror groups be viewed as simply an illustration of a larger problem that many states encounter, or is Pakistan sui generis with few relevant comparisons?

In a body of emerging work, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) argues that Pakistan is not the only country to have collaborated with non-state armed groups. The Indian state of Chhattisgarh protected and deployed a para-military group (SalwaJudum) against its Maoist insurgents, and Delhi collaborated with non-state groups to deal with the insurgents in the Northeast too. Similar examples can be cited from Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma’s Shan state etc. Yelena Biberman (Skidmore College), another scholar working on the outsourcing of security to non-state groups, argues roughly in the same vein, drawing comparisons between how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish rebels and how India used Ikhwan-ulMuslimoon in its counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Indeed, the problem is not only about collaboration. As we know, over the last few years, Pakistan has launched a brutal military assault against those terrorist groups that attack the Pakistani state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, but it has protected terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, or groups like the Afghan Taliban that violently seek to undermine the elected governments of Afghanistan. Staniland explores why this is so. The divergence is driven by two sets of factors: The ideological correspondence between the state and the armed group, and the operational utility of the armed organisation. By this logic, Pakistan would consistently support LeT and the Afghan Taliban because both of these organisations share the state’s ideology and are operationally strong, but its support for Jaish-e-Mohammed would be inconsistent, because the latter organisation also attacks Pakistani groups that have nothing to do with India, and the Pakistani army would wish to decimate the Pakistani Taliban because their target is the Pakistani state itself. Commitment to Islam is not the sole issue. Such a commitment must also be conjoined to a strong opposition to India and to the project of dominating Afghanistan.

This comparative argument about Pakistan is pitted against those who contend that Pakistan’s relationship with non-state actors is virtually unparalleled. In Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Christine Fair (Georgetown University) argues that Pakistan is ideology-driven, not security-driven. A standard security calculus, emphasising the primacy of national interest and a calibration of costs and benefits, would have demonstrated the necessity of compromise with India. But Fair writes: “For Pakistan’s men on horseback, not winning, even repeatedly, is not the same thing as losing. Simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition, defeat.”

Pakistan’s army sees victory, says Fair, simply “as the ability to continue fighting”, regardless of consequences for the nation’s development, welfare or international opinion. It is hard to find such states in history. Fair’s explanation of how Pakistan’s army distinguishes between good and bad terrorists is also different from Staniland’s. The bad ones are not only those who have turned against the Pakistani state and army, especially the Pakistani Taliban (as distinct from the Afghan Taliban), but also those who are inspired by the Deobandi religious tradition. The good terrorists, in contrast, are not only those opposed to India, but also ones inspired by the Al-Hadith tradition, which seeks Muslim unity and is not out to attack minority Muslim sects such as the Shias, or syncretistic Islamic groups such as the Sufis. Deobandiorganisations violently attack the latter groups as heretics or apostates, but Al-Hadith organisations, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, do not.

Whichever argument is correct, the implications are serious. The first implication is for the liberal approaches to understanding Pakistan.

Liberals have resolutely believed that enhancing people-to-people exchanges, experiencing cultural similarities and expanding trade with Pakistan would build the foundations of peace. It is not that such exchanges should be abandoned, but one should clearly see their limits. An argument about the re-discovery of a shared culture runs up against the very foundations of the Pakistani state.

In a famous exchange in the 1940s, Maulana Azad had argued that Pakistan was unnecessary because Muslims and Hindus, though religiously distinct, had the same Indian culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s argument was the opposite. Not only were Hindus and Muslims culturally distinct, but the preservation of Muslim culture, Jinnah said, required a separate state. It is Jinnah’s argument that became the basis for Pakistan. One can see why a discourse about cultural similarities can only threaten the state in Pakistan and its army will never allow it to become the dominant discourse. Maulana Azad can’t possibly become a Pakistani hero.

When anti-Indianism is constitutive, it can’t easily be expelled. That being so, should one believe that Pakistan’s army would give up its relationship with non-state terror groups that call India their incorrigible enemy? That can happen if such groups, to use Staniland’s argument, lose their operational utility. The strategic community in India may have to think seriously about how to make that happen. It would also help if Delhi repairs its relationship with Kashmir. Nothing lends greater strength to Pakistan’s army and terrorist organisations than unrest in Kashmir. Nothing lends greater unity to Pakistan’s deeply fractured polity and society than protests in Kashmir — not even Islam. Expected to be its cultural glue, Islam has actually been Pakistan’s source of interminable religious conflict.

On the basis of your reading, choose an appropriate title for the passage

Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in bold to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions.

The Uri attacks have returned India-Pakistan relations to an old and familiar groove. India blames Pakistani terrorists. Pakistan denies the charge, instead proposing that India’s oppression in Kashmir fuelled the attack on the army camp. This clash of narratives is unlikely to end. But as India contemplates its response, it may be worthwhile to look at how the world of scholars is analysing the relationship between the Pakistani state and its non-state armed groups.

For a long time, it has been observed that many states defy Max Weber’s theory that modern states seek a monopoly over the means of coercion and do not allow non-state groups to use violence. We know that states often don’t crush armed organisations, even if they can; or they liquidate some groups while protecting others. In light of this larger problem, the key puzzle about Pakistan is: Should Pakistan’s relationship with non-state terror groups be viewed as simply an illustration of a larger problem that many states encounter, or is Pakistan sui generis with few relevant comparisons?

In a body of emerging work, Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) argues that Pakistan is not the only country to have collaborated with non-state armed groups. The Indian state of Chhattisgarh protected and deployed a para-military group (SalwaJudum) against its Maoist insurgents, and Delhi collaborated with non-state groups to deal with the insurgents in the Northeast too. Similar examples can be cited from Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma’s Shan state etc. Yelena Biberman (Skidmore College), another scholar working on the outsourcing of security to non-state groups, argues roughly in the same vein, drawing comparisons between how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish rebels and how India used Ikhwan-ulMuslimoon in its counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in the 1990s and later. Indeed, the problem is not only about collaboration. As we know, over the last few years, Pakistan has launched a brutal military assault against those terrorist groups that attack the Pakistani state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, but it has protected terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, or groups like the Afghan Taliban that violently seek to undermine the elected governments of Afghanistan. Staniland explores why this is so. The divergence is driven by two sets of factors: The ideological correspondence between the state and the armed group, and the operational utility of the armed organisation. By this logic, Pakistan would consistently support LeT and the Afghan Taliban because both of these organisations share the state’s ideology and are operationally strong, but its support for Jaish-e-Mohammed would be inconsistent, because the latter organisation also attacks Pakistani groups that have nothing to do with India, and the Pakistani army would wish to decimate the Pakistani Taliban because their target is the Pakistani state itself. Commitment to Islam is not the sole issue. Such a commitment must also be conjoined to a strong opposition to India and to the project of dominating Afghanistan.

This comparative argument about Pakistan is pitted against those who contend that Pakistan’s relationship with non-state actors is virtually unparalleled. In Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Christine Fair (Georgetown University) argues that Pakistan is ideology-driven, not security-driven. A standard security calculus, emphasising the primacy of national interest and a calibration of costs and benefits, would have demonstrated the necessity of compromise with India. But Fair writes: “For Pakistan’s men on horseback, not winning, even repeatedly, is not the same thing as losing. Simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India’s supremacy, is, by definition, defeat.”

Pakistan’s army sees victory, says Fair, simply “as the ability to continue fighting”, regardless of consequences for the nation’s development, welfare or international opinion. It is hard to find such states in history. Fair’s explanation of how Pakistan’s army distinguishes between good and bad terrorists is also different from Staniland’s. The bad ones are not only those who have turned against the Pakistani state and army, especially the Pakistani Taliban (as distinct from the Afghan Taliban), but also those who are inspired by the Deobandi religious tradition. The good terrorists, in contrast, are not only those opposed to India, but also ones inspired by the Al-Hadith tradition, which seeks Muslim unity and is not out to attack minority Muslim sects such as the Shias, or syncretistic Islamic groups such as the Sufis. Deobandiorganisations violently attack the latter groups as heretics or apostates, but Al-Hadith organisations, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, do not.

Whichever argument is correct, the implications are serious. The first implication is for the liberal approaches to understanding Pakistan.

Liberals have resolutely believed that enhancing people-to-people exchanges, experiencing cultural similarities and expanding trade with Pakistan would build the foundations of peace. It is not that such exchanges should be abandoned, but one should clearly see their limits. An argument about the re-discovery of a shared culture runs up against the very foundations of the Pakistani state.

In a famous exchange in the 1940s, Maulana Azad had argued that Pakistan was unnecessary because Muslims and Hindus, though religiously distinct, had the same Indian culture. Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s argument was the opposite. Not only were Hindus and Muslims culturally distinct, but the preservation of Muslim culture, Jinnah said, required a separate state. It is Jinnah’s argument that became the basis for Pakistan. One can see why a discourse about cultural similarities can only threaten the state in Pakistan and its army will never allow it to become the dominant discourse. Maulana Azad can’t possibly become a Pakistani hero.

When anti-Indianism is constitutive, it can’t easily be expelled. That being so, should one believe that Pakistan’s army would give up its relationship with non-state terror groups that call India their incorrigible enemy? That can happen if such groups, to use Staniland’s argument, lose their operational utility. The strategic community in India may have to think seriously about how to make that happen. It would also help if Delhi repairs its relationship with Kashmir. Nothing lends greater strength to Pakistan’s army and terrorist organisations than unrest in Kashmir. Nothing lends greater unity to Pakistan’s deeply fractured polity and society than protests in Kashmir — not even Islam. Expected to be its cultural glue, Islam has actually been Pakistan’s source of interminable religious conflict.

According to the passage, which are those two factors by which separation is driven?

कोराडी थर्मल पावर स्टेशन किस राज्य में स्थित है?

विश्व धरोहर दिवस किस तारीख को मनाया जाता है?

भारत और रूस के बीच सैन्य अभ्यास का नाम क्या है?

पहले मेड इन इंडिया औद्योगिक रोबोट का नाम क्या है?

इनमें से किसे 75वें मास्टर दीनानाथ मंगेशकर पुरस्कार से सम्मानित किया गया है?

कौन सा शहर दूसरे राष्ट्रीय बाल फिल्म महोत्सव की मेजबानी कर रहा है?

हाल ही में भारत ने किसके साथ उच्च वोलटेज ट्रांसमिशन प्रणाली के निर्माण को प्रोत्साहन देने के लिए 175 मिलियन डॉलर के ऋण समझौते पर हस्ताक्षर किए है?

64वें राष्ट्रीय फिल्म पुरस्कारों में निम्न में से किसने मोस्ट फ़िल्म फ्रेंडली राज्य का पुरस्कार जीता है?

‘भारत के वीर’ वेब पोर्टल किस बैंक द्वारा संचालित है?

निम्नलिखित में से किसे यूएनएचसीआर गुडविल ऐंबैसडर के रूप में हाल ही में नियुक्त किया गया है?

किस बैंक ने हृदय डिपॉजिट योजना शुरू की है?

किस कंपनी ने हाल ही में ईबे इंडिया का अधिग्रहण किया है?

किस देश ने जी-7 के विदेश मंत्रियों की बैठक 2018 में आयोजित की है?

किस राज्य ने महिलाओं की सुरक्षा के लिए ‘सुरक्षा’ ऐप शुरू किया है?

भारत के पहले आदर्श डिजिटल गांव के रूप में विकसित करने के लिए किस कंपनी ने महाराष्ट्र के हरिसल गांव को गोद लिया है?